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ABSTRACT
A FORMAL OBJECT MODEL FOR LAYERED NETWORKS TO 
SUPPORT VERIFICATION AND SIMULATION
Rasha M. B. E. Morsi 
Old Dominion University, 2002 
Director Dr. James F. Leathrum, Jr.
This work presents an abstract formal model of the interconnection structure of 
the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM) developed using Object- 
Oriented modeling principles permitting it to serve as a re-usable platform in supporting 
the development of simulations and formal methods applied to layered network protocols. 
A simulation of the object model using MODSIM III was developed and Prototype 
Verification System (PVS) was used to show the applicability of the object model to 
formal methods by formally specifying and verifying a Global Systems for Mobile 
communications (GSM) protocol. This application has proved to be successful in two 
aspects. The first was showing the existence of discrepancies between informal standard 
protocol specifications, and the second was that communication over the layered GSM 
network was verified. Although formal methods is somewhat difficult and time 
consuming, this research shows the need for the formal specification of all 
communication protocols to support a clear understanding of these protocols and to 
provide consistency in their implementations.
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A domain for the application of this model is mobile cellular telecommunications 
systems. Mobile Communications is one of the most rapidly expanding sectors of 
telecommunications. Expectations of what a mobile cellular phone can do have vastly 
increased the complexity of cellular communication networks, which makes it imperative 
that protocol specifications be verified before implementation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Communications is one of the most rapidly expanding sectors of 
telecommunications. Expectations of what a mobile cellular phone can do have vastly 
increased the complexity of cellular communication networks. In the near future, a 
mobile phone is expected to offer us a lot more than just a phone call. In the new 
information age, the mobile phone will become a multi-media communications device, 
capable of sending and receiving graphic images and video. This will allow capabilities 
such as surfing the Internet, on-line shopping and videoconferencing, which introduce a 
high level of complexity into a system that also requires great scalability to meet 
demands.
The complexity of the requirements placed on cellular communication systems make it 
imperative that protocol specifications be verified before implementation. The 
development of network protocols and working network systems (software and hardware) 
is difficult due to the available testing platforms. Use of a real network for testing 
purposes is difficult, expensive, and intrusive on existing operations. In the past, use of 
simulation [36-40] and formal methods [2, 3, 4, 17, 24-29, 41] have assisted in this 
process, but as separate efforts. This usually resulted in a duplication of efforts. The 
development of simulation and formal verification from a common model facilitates the 
rapid development of both, allowing them to complement each other rather than replicate 
each other.
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The primary contribution of this work is the development of a common object model 
defining the interface and communication between layers in a layered network as defined 
by the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM) [1]. This abstraction 
allows a developer to focus on the development of protocols by fitting them into the 
layered structure and studying the interaction between layers without rebuilding the 
complete structure. This directly supports the development of simulations and formal 
models to support the verification of the protocols. In particular, the structure allows 
observance of the interaction between layers, permitting verification of the complete 
communication hierarchy without having to verify all layers in the verification of a single 
layer. This is a major step beyond previous work that verified a protocol on a single 
layer, ignoring the actual communication required to exchange information between like 
layers on different network stations.
In addition, the common object model was implemented in both a simulation language 
and a formal specification language to demonstrate the concept and facilitate future work 
using the model. In this work, the re-usable model is shown to support simulation by 
developing a simulation model that successfully simulates the communication within an 
implementation independent layered network. The applicability of the object model to the 
specification and verification of protocols is also shown using a Global Systems for 
Mobile Communication (GSM) [8,9] protocol. It is demonstrated that with proper 
application of abstraction techniques on the protocol, the model’s object oriented design 
simplifies the formal verification process by providing a reusable framework where basic 
concepts have already been developed and verified.
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1.1. FORMAL METHODS AND SIMULATION
Formal methods are a means of developing system descriptions in a higher order logic to 
which automated reasoning is applied [2]. The term is usually used to refer to a variety 
of mathematical modeling techniques that are applicable to computer system (software 
and hardware) design. Formal methods can be applied to selected components of a 
system and, at their most rigorous, formal methods involve computer-assisted proofs of 
key properties regarding the behavior of the system. Used early in the development life 
cycle, such an approach will play an important role in improving and debugging the 
system's requirements specification phase.
Computer simulation is the discipline o f designing a model of an actual or theoretical 
physical system, simulating the model on a digital computer, and analyzing the execution 
output. Simulation embodies the principle of “learning by doing” — to learn about the 
system we must first build a model of some sort and then operate the model. To 
understand reality and all of its complexity, we must build artificial objects and 
dynamically act out roles with them [36].
It is proposed in this work that it is advantageous to apply both formal methods and 
simulation techniques in the design process of communication protocols. Simulation is 
capable of testing certain scenarios defined by the designer, but simulation alone is 
incapable of testing the complete test space unless a simulation is performed for every 
possible scenario which is very time consuming and tedious. Formal methods would 
complement simulation in this aspect since a formal specification can benefit system
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design in two different ways: concepts and notations from mathematics can provide 
methodological assistance by helping us think and communicate our ideas, and 
mathematical modeling can allow us to calculate some properties of our designs.
A drawback of formal methods is that they have weak support for real time systems. 
Since time ranges over an infinite domain, all tools that have been developed for finite 
state verification cannot be naively applied to real time systems. On the other hand, 
simulations are well suited to deal with stochastic models and are more frequently used 
for the performance analysis of systems. Therefore, it is proposed that formal methods be 
applied to behavioral verification and simulation to performance analysis.
The process of formalizing a specification provides a simple validation check, since it 
forces a level of explicitness not available in informal representations. Once a formal 
specification is developed, it can be formally challenged by defining properties that 
should hold and proving that they do indeed hold. This increases the test space coverage 
mentioned earlier, since properties about the system are tested, not specific scenarios. It 
needs to be mentioned that the efficiency of the formal proofs will depend on the 
designer proving all necessary properties of a design.
A further consideration is the mathematical domain of discourse. Applications that are 
heavily based on numerical processing, especially those using floating point arithmetic, 
pose some difficulties for formal methods, as well as highly procedural or numerical 
applications, or applications that have few unifying features (e.g., stochastic processes).
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Historically, working with axiomatic representations of real numbers to reason with rigor 
about traditional engineering mathematics has been found to be an awkward and daunting 
task [2]. On the other hand, applications that can be modeled using the domains of logic 
and discrete mathematics benefit from easier formalization, more tractable reasoning, and 
better formal methods tool support
Formal methods have been used in the past in the verification of communication 
protocols but its success has been hindered by the lack of reusable models. Usually, 
system proofs are performed, but frameworks to prove classes of systems are lacking 
[44]. It now becomes apparent that both simulation and formal methods have limitations 
and by creating a common model, the model development necessary to support both 
activities can be reduced.
1.2. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL DEVELOPMENT
Protocol design is usually carried out in two phases. The first phase involves the 
definition of the functions of the protocol as far as possible in an implementation- 
independent way, but in such a way that proper interworking of peer protocol entities is 
guaranteed [17]. The resulting design supports the definition of open systems and is 
usually produced by a standardization body, and published as an international standard or 
recommendation. It is then known as a protocol. The second phase is producing the 
implementation-dependent design.
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A large number of practical protocols have only informal English specifications. In the 
past, neither simulation nor formal methods have been heavily used in the 
communication protocol design process. A formal specification helps in achieving a 
consistent interpretation and thus decreases ambiguities and increases the likelihood of 
interoperability of implementations with multiple, independent developers. Formal 
methods and simulation provide an increased confidence level in the protocol design.
13. OBJECT-ORIENTED MODEL FOR LAYERED NETWORKS
In this work, an abstract formal model of the interconnection structure of the OSI-RM 
was developed using Object-Oriented (0 0 ) modeling principles permitting it to serve as 
a re-usable platform. Once this framework is in place, it will help protocol designers to 
develop simulations and formal verifications focusing more on the protocol o f interest 
rather than the layered structure of the network in which it resides. It also provides a 
mechanism to study the interaction between protocols at different layers rather than just 
the functionality of a single protocol. This will obviously reduce time necessary for users 
to develop new protocols or refine existing ones with a higher confidence.
The present work is focused on the modeling of the OSI-RM, but this method is 
applicable to other layered communication standards in both networking and 
telecommunications such as the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) 
[42], the Runtime Infrastructure (RTI) in the High Level Architecture (HLA) [43], and 
Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM) [8,9], among others. The abstract 
formal model of the OSI Reference Model was simulated using MODSIM III. An
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example of a GSM protocol was used as an application of this model. The Prototype 
Verification System (PVS) [11] was used to verify the Mobile Originated (MO) Call 
setup procedure (part o f the Radio Interface Layer 3 -RIL3) [33].
1.4. OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 is a background chapter introducing the OSI-RM along with a detailed 
description of the layered structure, cellular communications, GSM and formal methods. 
In Chapter 3, current work in protocol verification and object oriented design modeling is 
presented. Chapter 4 discusses the GSM Public Land Mobile Network and its architecture 
while Chapter 5 includes a description of the OSI-RM formal object model along with the 
MODSIM simulation developed. A generalized, re-usable PVS specification structure is 
presented for the OSI-RM discussing horizontal vs. vertical validation of communication. 
Chapter 6 introduces the GSM Radio Interface Layer 3 protocol, which includes a brief 
description of the RIL3 sub-layer communication structure and the formal verification of 
one of its protocols as an example for the application of our re-usable OSI-RM formal 
communication model.
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2. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, the OSI-RM is introduced in Section 2.1, along with a detailed description 
of it’s layered structure. A short history of cellular communications and Global Systems 
for Mobile Communications (GSM), including an explanation of GSM’s architectural 
components, is presented in Section 2.2. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses formal methods, 
its advantages, modeling using formal methods and formal specification and verification 
languages.
2.1. OSI-RM
The Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM) is a standardized, empty 
framework, the aim of which is to provide a common framework that allows existing and 
evolving applications (e.g. FTP, telnet, etc..) to cooperate irrespective of the type of 
computer on which they are running. It provides a common basis for the coordination of 
standards development for systems interconnection, while allowing existing standards to 
be placed into perspective within the overall model [1]. The OSI-RM does not serve as an 
implementation specification; it provides a conceptual and functional framework that 
allows professionals worldwide to work productively and independently on the 
development of standards for each layer in the model. The OSI is concerned with the 
exchange of information between open systems and not the internal functioning of each 
individual real open system.
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2.1.1. The layer concept
The OSI-RM consists of seven layers; each layer performs a well defined function and 
provides a set of functions to the layer above, and relies on the functions of the layer 
below (Figure 1). Each entity communicates with the entities above or below it across an 







Figure 1. The layer concept
The principles used to determine the seven layers in the Reference Model are [1]:
• Create enough layers so that the system-engineering task of describing and 
integrating them is not too complicated.
• Create a boundary at a point where the description of services can be small and the 
number of interactions across the boundary is minimal.
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• Collect similar functions in the same layer and separate layers to handle functions that 
are different in the process performed or the technology involved.
• Each layer is supposed to be independent of the other layers so that a layer can be 
totally redesigned without changing the services expected from or provided to the 
adjacent layers (Object Oriented approach).








Figure 2. The seven layers of the OSI-RM
In Figure 2, the application layer provides network services. It includes functions 
performed by programs as well as functions performed by human beings. The 
Presentation layer converts data to the representation used by the local computer while 
the Session layer provides the ability for cooperating presentation entities to organize and
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synchronize their dialogue and manage their data exchange (i.e., establishes sessions 
between presentation entities). The Transport layer multiplexes data streams from 
different applications and provides transparent transfer of data between session-entities. 
The route taken by the packets through the network is provided by the Network layer. It 
directs packets to the correct destination computer. The Data Link layer detects and 
corrects any errors on the link. It also provides flow control from one node to the next, 
and finally, the Physical layer defines the characteristics of the physical connections, e.g., 
type of wire, etc.. This is the only layer that actually sends bits to another computer.
2.1.3. The Reference Model















N Entity N Entity
N -su b ­
systemfunction: function:
N-Protocol
Figure 3. An abstract view of two adjacent layers ia the OSI-RM (35|
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A layer may contain only one subsystem which is an element in the hierarchical division 
of an open system. The sub-system can interact directly with elements in the next higher 
or the next lower division of that open system. Within the sub-system, one or more 
entities may be present An N-entity is an active element within an N-subsystem 
embodying a set of capabilities defined for that N-layer and the N-protocol is a set of 
rules and formats which determine the communication behavior of the N-entities in the 
performance of the N-functions [1].
Communication between the layers is achieved through the Service Access Points (SAP). 
These are points that are used by entities in adjacent layers to provide services. 
Communication between peer N+l-entities is possible. The association is established 










Flgare 4. Commiiaicatioi betweea peer-eatities in u  opea system
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The communication in Figure 4 is very similar to communication between open systems 
shown in Figure 5.
Application 
"  +
End-to-end communication service 
 ►
Presentation 
















~ ^ T ~
Physical Layer
Figure 5. Example of data flow via intermediate open systems
2.2. CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS
Cellular mobile radio, the technology that enables everyone to communicate with 
anybody anywhere, has created an entire industry in mobile communication. This 
industry is rapidly growing and has become the backbone for business success and a part 
of modem lifestyles all over the world. In this section, an overview of a basic cellular 
system will be discussed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.2.1. A basic cellular system
Several attributes are needed for the realization of a cellular radio service:
1. A contiguous arrangement of radio cells so that the mobile units can always 
operate at acceptable radio signal levels
2. A roaming feature by which mobile units can have continuous service as they 
roam the geographical area of the service
3. Frequency agility in the radio telephone
4. A fully integrated transparent fixed network managing these operations 





Deditaed Voice Ckade Circuits
Ceil sies 
( Radio base 
a a k n  sies)
Figure 6. Cellular system
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A basic cellular system consists of three parts: a mobile unit, a cell site, and a Mobile 
Telephone Switching Office (MTSO).
• Mobile Units contain a control unit, a transceiver, and an antenna.
•  A Cell Site provides interface between the MTSO and the mobile units. It has a 
control unit, radio cabinets, antennas, a power plant (just in case the power is cut off), 
and data terminals.
•  The MTSO is the central coordinating element for all cell sites. It 
contains the cellular processor and cellular switch. It interfaces with the telephone 
company zone offices, controls call processing, and handles billing activities.
2.2.2. Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM)
By the end of the 1980s, it became clear that analog cellular systems would not be able to 
meet continuing demand unless something was done about the inherent limitations of 
these systems, namely:
• severely confined spectrum allocations,
•  a perception that the systems were limited in usefulness because of interference 
occurring while the mobiles moved about in a multi-path fading environment
• inability to substantially reduce the cost of mobile terminals and infrastructure
• incompatibility among various analog systems, which prevents the subscriber from 
using the phone abroad.
The solution was to use digital techniques. In 1982, the Conference of European Posts 
and Telegraphs (CEPT) formed a study group called GSM (Groupe Special Mobile) to 
develop a set of common standards for a future pan-European cellular mobile
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network, which was to be the solution they were looking for. In 1989, GSM 
responsibility was transferred to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI), and in 1992, the commercial launch of GSM service in Europe took place. GSM 
now stands for Global Systems for Mobile Communications, and its popularity is rapidly 
growing. In 199S, GSM had more than 5 million subscribers, not only in Europe, but all 
over the world.
GSM is considered to be an evolving standard, where the specifications and networks are 
produced using a phased approach. Phases 1 and 2 are now in service. Phase 2+ 
addendum is being updated on a regular basis according to market needs and availability 
of specifications. Phase 3 (UMTS) is in the design process.
2.2.3. GSM Architecture
The GSM system is a combination of three major sub-systems: the network subsystem, 
the radio subsystem, and the operation support subsystem. The network subsystem 
includes equipment and functions related to end-to-end calls, management of subscribers, 
mobility, and interface with the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The radio 
subsystem includes equipment and functions related to the management of the 
connections on the radio path, including handovers (the process of changing the 
frequency channel while going from one cell to the next). This equipment includes:
• the Mobile Station (MS),
• the Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) which is a smart card with a 
microprocessor, a RAM, and a ROM that contains subscriber ID information,
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• the Base Transceiver Station (BTS), a network component present in each 
cell that contains several transceivers, and
• the Base Station Controller (BSC) which is a network component with 
functions to control one or more BTSs.
Finally, the operation support subsystem contains the Operational and Management 
Center (OMC) which includes operation and management of GSM equipment and 
supports the operator network interface. The OMC also maintains a country’s Home 
Location Register (HLR) and performs administrative functions within a country, e.g., 
billing. Figure 7 [8] shows a typical architecture for GSM; following that is a brief 














Ftgare 7. Typical GSM architecture
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MSC : Mobile-services Switching Center. It performs functions of switching, routing and 
control of the call and charging and accounting. Also controls the internetworking 
with fixed networks.
BSS : BTS + BSC, viewed by the MSC through a single interface as being the entity 
responsible for communication with the MSs in a certain area.
HLR: Home Location Register, current location and all subscriber parameters of a 
mobile station are permanently stored.
VLR: Visitor Location Register, the location register where all relevant parameters 
concerning a mobile station are stored as long as the MS is in a location area 
controlled by this register.
AU C: Authentication center, contains subscriber authentication keys and generates 
security related parameters depending on implementation.
EIR : Equipment Identity Register, International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) 
numbers are stored.
EC : Echo canceller, reduces the annoying effect caused by mobile network when 
connected to a PSTN circuit.
IW F: Internetworking Function, interface between MSC and other networks such as 
PSTN and ISDN.
It can be seen in Figure 7 that GSM decided to specify not only the air interface, but also 
the main interfaces that identify different parts of the architecture. The three dominant 
parts are: an interface between the MSC and the BSC, an A-interface between the BSC 
and the BTS, and the radio interface between the BTS and the MS.
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2.2.4. Functional Layers of GSM
The GSM system can be described by considering several functional layers arranged in 
hierarchical foim. These layers are the physical layer, the data link layer and Layer 3. The 
physical layer is the lowest layer o f radio interface and it provides functions to transfer 
bit streams over the physical radio links. The data link layer provides a reliable dedicated 
signaling link between the Mobile Station (MS) and Base Transceiver Station (BTS), 
details of which will be explained in the next section. Layer 3, which is of particular 
interest here, is considered as the application layer. It consists of three sub-layers : Radio 
Resource Management (RR), Mobility Management (MM), and the Call Control 
Management (CC or CM) sub-layer. The overall objectives of these three sub-layers are:
•  RR performs the establishment, operation, and release of a dedicated radio channel 
connection,
•  MM defines the dialog between the MS and the network, provides connection 
management services to the Call Control Layer, location update, authentication, and 
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) reallocation,
• CC performs the establishment, maintenance, and termination of circuit-switched 
calls, and includes independent entities for Short Message Services (SMS) and 
Supplementary Services (SS).
2.2.5. GSM Protocol Model
Figure 8 [8] shows the signaling protocols in the GSM system and how they relate to the 
seven layers of the OSI model.
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Figure 8. Signaling protocoil of the GSM syitem
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The RR protocols provide control functions for the operation of common and dedicated
channels. This sub-layer contains many protocols, namely:
• RIL3 RR : Radio Interface Layer 3; a protocol which establishes and releases radio 
connections between MS and various BSCs for die duration of the call, provides 
system information broadcasting, and inter- and intracell change of channels. The 
MM and CC versions deal with the mobility and call processing issues.
• RSM: Radio Subsystem Management protocol provides functions between the BTS 
and the BSC.
• DTAP: Direct Transfer Application Part protocol provides RR messages between the 
MS and the MSC.
• BSSMAP: Base Station Subsystem Management Application Part protocol provides 
RR messages between the BSC and the MSC
• “Distribution” protocol: makes the distinction between DTAP and BSSMAP.
• TCAP: Transaction Capabilities Application Part, supports transactions between 2 
nodes of the network and manages transaction on an end-to-end basis
• MAP: Mobile Application Part Protocol, functions between the MSC, VLR, HLR, 
and AUC in the form of query and response messages. These protocols are designated 
as MAP/B through MAP/H.
2J. FORMAL METHODS
Formal methods are an efficient way to satisfy the growing demand for accurate and
reliable mobile computing services. It is a means of developing systems in a higher order
logic to which automated or semi-automated reasoning may be applied. Formal Methods
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refer to the use of techniques from logic to discrete mathematics in the specification, 
design, and construction of computer systems and software. It can be used to specify and 
model the behavior o f a system and to mathematically verify that the system design and 
implementation satisfy the system functional and safety properties.
There are a variety of techniques that vary in their form and rigor (Figure 9). There is the 
occasional mathematical notation embedded in the English text, which is the least 
rigorous form of formal methods. The most rigorous form and most expensive is the use 
of a fully formal specification language for the specification of a system. What makes a 
technique a “Formal Method” is the logic based programming language concepts (e.g., 
data types, module structure, generics), which are able to express what is done without 
saying how it is done.
least rigorous spectrum of rigor most rigorous
Occasional mathematical Fully formal specification
notation embedded in •  •  •  languages with precise
English specifications semantics
Figure 9. Formal Methods' spectrum of rigor
There are many advantages to Formal Methods. They can discover defects in the design 
and specification phases of a system’s life cycle thus reducing the probability of them 
occurring in the implementation phase. Also defining specifications formally makes the 
system more consistent since requirements can be checked in a repeatable manner. 
Formal methods can be applied to selected components of a system, and can be used just 
to check selected properties of that system. Used early in the development life cycle, such
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an approach will play an important role in improving and debugging the system's 
requirements specification phase (Figure 10). The process of formalizing a specification 
provides a simple validation check, since it forces a level of explicitness not available in 
informal representations. Once a formal specification is developed, it can be formally 
challenged by defining properties that should hold, and proving that they do indeed hold. 
















Figure 10. Development stages of a formal system
A validation model is a formal model that defines the interactions of processes in a 
system. It does not resolve implementation details nor does it say how a message is to be 
transmitted, encoded, or sorted. By simplifying the problem in this way, we eliminate 
disturbing detail, avoid premature commitment to implementation, and focus on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
essence of the problem at hand [1]. Some phrases that are often used in Formal Methods 
are in need of some explanation. These are described here.
A Formal Specification is a translation of a non-mathematical description (diagrams, 
tables, English text) into a formal specification language with a concise description of 
high-level behavior and properties of a system. The well-defined formal language 
semantics used support formal deduction about the specification.
Formal proofs are a complete and convincing argument for validity of some property of 
the system description. They are constructed as a series of steps which draw conclusions 
from a set of assumptions. This eliminates ambiguity and subjectivity inherent when 
drawing informal conclusions. Formal proofs may be manual but are usually constructed 
with automated assistance.
Abstraction is the process of paying strict attention to the aspects of a phenomenon that 
are important and paying less attention to those that are not. It is important for 
specification readability, implementation independence and modeling convenience. A 
protocol specification should give the designer access to a range of abstraction levels. 
With a very complex protocol, a designer needs to work at a very high level of 
abstraction to gain an overall understanding of the protocol behavior. Abstraction helps 
avoid premature commitment to design and implementation choices
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2J.1. Modeling using Formal Methods
For a chosen application, the process of applying Formal Methods involves going
through some phases of development, such as: characterizing the application, modeling,
specification, analysis, and documentation.
•  The Characterization Phase involves total understanding of an application in order to 
be able to justifiably choose an appropriate model and the most appropriate 
specification and validation techniques.
• The Modeling Phase is where a suitable mathematical representation is chosen to 
formalize the application. Calculus o f Communicating Systems (CCS), which is a 
process algebra developed for modeling concurrent communicating systems, is an 
example.
• The Specification Phase involves formalizing the application by composing a 
specification using the chosen model and analyzing the syntactic and semantic 
correctness of the specification.
•  The Analysis Phase is the validation phase. It involves interpreting the specification 
and proving key properties.
•  The Documentation Phase includes recording any assumptions made in the proof and 
all necessary aspects of documentation needed to provide a clear and unambiguous 
portrayal of specification requirements.
In the context of formal methods, the most useful models tend to be abstract
representations that focus on essential characteristics expressed in reasonably general
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terms and formalized in judiciously chosen mathematics, that is, in mathematical 
representations that are suitably expressive and provide sufficient analytic power [2].
The advantages of using mathematical models are:
• They are more precise than informal descriptions written in the plain English since
thorough examination and explicit assumptions need to be made.
• They can be used to predict the behavior of the system being modeled, and
• They can be analyzed using existing methods of mathematical reasoning.























Figure 11. General formal method tools
2.4. FORMAL SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION LANGUAGES 
Formal methods are supported in the specification and analysis phases with mechanized 
tools that perform syntactic, semantic, and proof checking. One such tool is the Prototype 
Verification System (PVS) [11]. PVS was primarily written by Sam Owre and N. Shanker 
of SRI International Computer Science Laboratory and builds on nearly 20 years of 
experience at SRI in building and using tools to support formal methods. It is a general-
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purpose verification system which provides mechanized support for formal specification 
and verification. The distinguishing feature of PVS is its synergistic integration of an 
expressive specification language and powerful theorem-proving capabilities.
PVS consists of a specification language, a number of predefined theories, a theorem 
prover, and various utilities and documentation. Some elements of the specification 
language are made possible because the typechecker can use theorem proving which 
allows efficient treatment of many examples that are considered difficult for other 
verification systems. The specification language is based on classical, typed higher-oider 
logic intended mainly for the formalization of requirements and design-level 
specifications analysis of intricate and difficult problems. Some applications of PVS are 
algorithms and architectures for fault-tolerant flight control systems and problems in 
hardware and real time system design
Recently, PVS has been used for the formal specification of Communication protocols 
[26,27,28] and is used in this work for the development of a structure for specifying 
layered protocols and then the specification of part of the RIL3 protocol for GSM as an 
example.
There are other languages being used, some of which are as follows:
•  Language o f Temporal Ordering Specifications (LOTOS) is an international formal 
specification technique for specifying concurrent and distributed systems. It consists 
of a language for specifying processes (similar to CCS - mentioned later) and an
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algebraic specification language called ACT ONE. LOTOS has been applied 
extensively, in both universities and industry, to the specification of OSI protocols.
•  Calculus o f Communicating Systems (CCS) [19] which is a process algebra developed 
for modeling concurrent communicating systems. CCS has very sparse yet rich 
semantics, and a rich set of laws, used to specify the algorithmic structure of 
concurrent processes. The Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench (CWB) is used to 
model check the CCS specifications.
•  The Higher Order Logic (HOL) system is a theorem prover that uses higher-order 
logic to prove theorems about specifications using the meta Language ML.
• Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) is used to check finite state systems against their 
specifications. It uses its own state-machine language to model the system, and uses 
CTL (an extension of Boolean Logic) to define the set of properties. CTL has four 
formulas: atomic formulas, propositional formulas, next-state logic, and 'until' logic. 
One can readily specify a system as a synchronous Mealy machine, or as an 
asynchronous network of abstract, nondeterministic processes. The language provides 
for modeler hierarchical descriptions, and for the definition of reusable 
components[31]. SMV is freeware limited to research institutions. It was developed at 
Carnegie Mellon University.
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3. CURRENT WORK IN PROTOCOL VERIFICATION AND 
OBJECT ORIENTED MODELING
3.1. FORMAL METHODS AND THEIR USE IN COMMUNICATION 
PROTOCOL VERIFICATION
An engineer in telecommunications needs a method for describing feature behavior in a 
telephone system (like call forwarding) in a way that is complete, consistent and 
unambiguous. The application of Formal Methods is a solution that provides reliability 
and a notation for the formal specification of a system whereby the desired properties are 
described and can be reasoned about
Formal Methods are in fact increasingly being used in the telecommunications industry. 
It’s use is becoming quite popular in the formal verification of communication protocols. 
Work has been done in the formal verification of different aspects of the protocols 
available in the OSI Session Layer. Work is being done on the ATM ABR scheme [25], 
Kermit FTP [21], IP Protocols [26]. This work is discussed in this chapter, emphasizing 
how Formal Methods are being used in the verification/validation process.
3.2. CURRENT WORK IN PROTOCOL VERIFICATION
Formal Description Techniques (FDTs) are becoming of particular interest in the area of 
design, validation, and verification of protocols. This interest arises because of the need 
for reliable and well defined protocols in the ever-growing industry of communicating 
systems. A protocol is essentially a system of concurrent, independent, entities that
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interact via a possibly unreliable exchange of messages [4]. It, by definition, must state 
precisely what sequence of events are allowed, and present all the details in an 
unambiguous manner to a large audience of implemented to insure that independently 
developed systems work together seamlessly.
The advance in protocol specification using FDTs in recent years has opened up a new 
horizon for protocol development [16]. Protocol design is usually carried out in two 
phases. The first phase involves the definition of the functions of the protocol as far as 
possible in an implementation-independent manner, but in such a way that proper 
interworking of peer protocol entities is guaranteed [17]. The resulting design supports 
the definition of open systems and is usually produced by a standardization body, and 
published as an international standard or recommendation. It is then known as a protocol. 
The second phase is producing the implementation-dependant design.
A large number of practical protocols have only informal English specifications. A 
formal specification helps in achieving a consistent interpretation and thus decreases 
ambiguities and increases the likelihood o f interoperability of implementations. Figure 
12 shows the stages of verification and validation that are used in protocol design and 
development. The main feature of formal development is stepwise refinement. The 
specification becomes clear from a process of transformations going from the highest 
abstraction level to the lowest one where each step is validated and verified.















Fig*re 12. Stages la Protocol Desiga and Developmeat[18|
A main concern of protocol designers is testing the consequences of a specification, and 
gaining confidence in its validity. Another main concern is verifying that the 
implementation satisfies the specification. It is obvious that verification is one of the 
essential reasons for the interest in the use of formal methods in protocol design. This is 
so because of the necessity that different implementations have to conform to the 
specification in order to be mutually compatible. Several efforts in the use of formal 
methods applied to communication are presented here.
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3.2.1. OSI-RM Session Layer specification and verification
Work has been done in the application of existing mathematical methods and automated 
tools to specify and test existing protocols [5]. The chosen formal method in this case was 
Milner’s process algebra called the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). CCS 
was applied to the specification and verification of the Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) Session Layer (SL). The Session Layer service and Session Layer protocol were 
modeled on CCS, and verified using CCS’s automated model checker, and Edinburgh 
Concurrency Workbench (CWB). The Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench (CWB) was 
used to model check the CCS specifications. In order to formally verify a protocol, CCS 
needed to be embedded into a formal verification system. The Larch Shared Language, 
which is supported by an automated theorem prover called Penelope, was chosen.
As a result of this work, CCS was shown to be a suitable formal method used to specify, 
validate and verify protocols. Stepwise refinement was used to obtain a protocol 
specification from a general service specification. It was also verified that the protocol 
specification behaves in the same way as the session service specification.
Application of CCS to the specification and verification of the Session Layer provided 
the conclusion that the use of Formal methods aids in the understanding of the problem 
and leads to unambiguous and correct specifications. Formal specification and 
verification exposes many design errors that would be very difficult to discover through 
manual verification. For example, some typing errors and inconsistencies were 
discovered in the ISO standard.
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The use of formal theorem provers exposed all assumptions that must be used in order to 
completely specify and verify the protocol. They were also found to be suitable for 
reusable parameterized specifications, such as the specification of a general buffer of size 
n. It was concluded that it was easy to translate ISO standards into concise and 
understandable CCS specifications.
3.2.2. Standardization of RLP1 protocol
The formal language SDL was used to standardize and validate the RLP1 protocol [20] 
and see the effect of the validation on its standardization before publication. SDL was 
used since it is a well recognized formal language and it is also used by the international 
telecommunication community. The biggest disadvantage of using SDL, discovered 
through this work, is the lack of suitable tools. Formal SDL was seen to be very tedious 
and as a result the committee used informal SDL text extensively. Most verification was 
done using visual inspection and manual walk-throughs. In this respect, SDL was found 
to be very difficult to use in the specification of complex algorithms. The SDL code was 
translated into Promela and SPIN was used for the validation process.
It was concluded through this work that no single formal notation is going to be adequate 
or appropriate for a complete standard or system. A suite of accepted formalisms for 
various parts of a standard is required. It was also noted that even without validation 
tools, a formal notation is useful during standardization since it allows informal 
validation via code walk-throughs.
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3.23. Specification and Verification of Kermit FTP
The specification and verification of the popular Kermit File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is 
another example of the use of formal methods in the specification and verification of 
communication protocols [22]. The goal of this work was to obtain a faithful, readable 
specification which allows one to formalize the intuitive verification proof without much 
overhead [22]. The evolving algebra approach was used in the specification and 
verification of two more abstract communication protocols used by various versions of 
Kermit: the alternating bit protocol and the sliding window protocol. These two protocols 
have also been specified and verified by many authors [22, 23, 24]. Kermit was 
considered at three different layers of abstraction: the session, transport, and data-link 
layers. Safety and liveness properties were proven
3.2.4. Specification of ATM’s ABR protocols
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is a network protocol that provides a common 
format for transmitting voice, data, and video over B-ISDN systems. ATM's available bit 
rate (ABR) service was used as a case study for the application of formal specification 
and verification of communication protocols [25]. In this work, the ABR protocols were 
modeled by parameterized communicating extended finite state machines (FSM) with 
timers. The protocol was formally specified by the specification of the transitions of the 
system.
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3.25. Summary
It is clear that most of the work being done on the validation and verification of 
communication systems is confined to the V&V of communication protocols. There has 
not yet been published any work done on a more abstract level to formally specify and 
verify a reusable structure in the telecommunication industry.
The usefulness of formal methods in communication system design is obvious. It aids in 
the understanding of the problem and leads to unambiguous and correct specifications. It 
also exposes many design errors and inconsistencies that would otherwise be discovered 
during the implementation stage. The drawbacks are the complexity of the effort and the 
lack of reusable effort.
33. FORMAL METHODS AND OBJECT ORIENTED MODELING
The goal of a design methodology is to provide a simple and efficient means for 
structuring the process leading from an informal application description to a precise 
design specification [14]. Using an object-oriented approach, principles of aggregating 
data items together with operations performed on them, is applied, calling the whole an 
object. An application may be a composition of such objects. There are a few advantages 
of this approach:
1) Information hiding principle is naturally supported
2) At the informal level of description, the concept of an object is very common and 
hence a design description and implementation framework supporting this concept 
would lead to more readable specifications.
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3) Properties, which are defined for general types of objects, can be inherited by objects 
in a sub-class.
Formal methods adds mathematical rigor to the development, analysis and operation of 
computer-based systems. Although Formal Methods are often presented by devotees as 
‘the’ solution to the increasing complexity of information systems, its use in industry is 
minimal, primarily due to the added complexity. Both Object Orientation and Formal 
Methods have evolved separately even though many aspects of the object oriented 
paradigm are similar to those found in formal methods. These include the description of 
class behavior in an implementation independent manner, the use of inheritance to 
indicate subtype relations, and the reliance on well understood mathematical concepts 
and abstractions such as sets, sequences and functions.
It seems obvious that a combination of formal methods and object oriented design 
concepts would be very beneficial. In recent years, researchers have started to investigate 
the benefits of this integration.
One of the recognized strengths of the object-oriented paradigm is that a common core of 
basic ideas can support modeling at all levels of abstraction [13]. Object oriented design 
methods usually comprise a number of design steps.
A preliminary informal step consists of the identification of the general problem and any 
specifics related to the intended model. The first step is the identification of the main
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components of the model. This involves the description of the functionalities to be 
provided by the set of entities in the model. It also provides the relationship among these 
entities. The second step is the allocation of the functions as operations offered by objects 
identified in step one. Some new objects may be uncovered by some of these functions 
which would then be integrated in the model. The last step involves the definition of the 
behavior of the objects. This behavior would consider possible sequences of operation 
calls and the processing that would be needed for them.
33.1. Formal Methods and Object Orientation: The gains
Object Oriented designers need formal techniques in order to support their methodologies 
with a sound formal basis and formal methods people use object-oriented engineering 
concepts to make their mathematical models easier to handle [13]. Figure 13 shows how 
object-oriented features are incorporated into a formal method. From an object-oriented 
perspective, there are a number of benefits to be gained by the use of formal description 
techniques in the design process. Formal description techniques enhance the 
understanding of the object-oriented models. This is due to the un-ambiguity of the 
formal specification process, which also promotes the concept of re-use o f model 
components.











Figure 13. Incorporation of object-oriented features into formal methods |13)
The perception is different for the formal methods community. The idea is to make their 
languages more user-friendly by applying concepts of object orientation. Many formal 
specification languages have been either extended or re-interpreted within an object- 
oriented framework. LOTOS [10] and Z [46] are examples of such languages. The model 
used to allow for this re-interpretation was developed by a group at BT Labs in the UK. 
They developed a set theoretic model that incorporated the basic structural ideas of the 
object-oriented paradigm (OOP). The group claims that by identifying a formal language 
with four basic concepts, it is possible to interpret it according to the paradigm. These 
four concepts are:
• partial specifications (class templates)
• instantiation rales
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• incremental modification of class templates
•  pre-order on the set o f class templates which maps into a set-theoretic inclusion 
hierarchy of classes.
This work was later formalized in the ISO Reference Model for Open Distributed
Processing (ODP) [14].
The OOP used in a formal methods environment adds value to it. The following are
points to be noted on the gains of applying OOP concepts to formal methods:
• A more concise specification is achieved by factoring out commonalties. OOP 
concepts allow for this through the distinction between objects and classes advocated 
by the paradigm.
•  Cleaner, easier to refine specifications are achieved by the use of the natural 
separation of abstraction levels in the OOP, induced by the distinction between 
internal behavior of an entity and external communication through well defined 
interfaces.
•  The specification of concurrency is a main concern in formal methods and is very 
difficult to handle. Objects in OOP are a natural unit for concurrency control due to 
the fact that OOP perceives the world as a collection of loosely coupled agents 
executing activities in parallel.
• Re-use of specifications can be achieved through inheritance.
•  A basic class specification can be refined to suit the more detailed requirements 
imposed upon it for use in different levels o f  abstraction.
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• Object orientation simplifies the writing of the specification and helps in the formal 
reasoning stages. This can be seen by thinking that what holds for a class, must hold 
for every subclass. Re-use of proofs would be an enormous advantage here.
Looking at the previous points, it becomes obvious how useful object-orientation is in the 
world of formal methods.
Object oriented design methods add a new dimension to the models used in formal 
methods and brings them closer to the real world, but there is a tradeoff. Although the 
adoption of object oriented paradigm brings powerful abstraction and structure 
mechanisms to the design; classes, inheritance, and other constructs need to be formally 
defined and integrated within the semantic model if they are to be used in a truly formal 
methodology. However, the usefulness o f object-oriented notions in making the 
understanding of specifications easier is a great benefit. Unambiguity is a main concern 
in formal definitions and the OOP enhances this quality.
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4. GSM PUBLIC LAND MOBILE NETWORK (PLMN)
4.1. PLMN, AN INTRODUCTION
The GSM Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) is a network whose general objectives 
are to give users a wide range of services and facilities, both voice and non-voice, that are 
compatible with those offered by fixed networks through standardized access to these 
networks. It also gives services and facilities exclusive to mobile situations and 
compatibility of access to the GSM network to any mobile subscriber in any country of 
the CEPT who operates the GSM system. Some of these services include automatic 
roaming, locating and updating mobile subscribers. A GSM PLMN aims to give 
subscribers a service with a good quality level to a wide range o f mobile stations, 
including vehicle-mounted stations, portable stations, and handheld stations. It also aims 
to give high efficiency from the radio-electrical spectrum and allow an attractive 
economic cost in terms of both infrastructure and mobile equipment.
4.2. PLMN NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Figure 14 shows the basic configuration of a PLMN. An exchange of data occurs 
between the entities in the PLMN. Some of these entities and functions are described as 
follows:














Flgare 14. ConflguratioB of a PLMN [34|
1 “© ETSI2000. further use, modification, redistribution is strictly prohibited. ETSI standards are available 
from publication@etsi.fr, and http://www.etsi.org/eds/eds.htm
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The Home Location Register (HLR):
This database is responsible for the management of mobile subscribers. A PLMN may 
contain one or more of these HLRs; the exact number would depend on the number of 
subscribers, the capacity of the equipment and the organization of the network. It stores 
all the subscription data, which includes the location of each MS for call routing 
purposes. All management interventions occur on this database. The HLRs have no direct 
control of the MSCs. Two important numbers are also stored in the HLRs, the IMSI and 
the MDISDN. Other information included is the location information (VLR number), 
basic telecommunication services subscription information, service restrictions (e.g. 
roaming limitation) and supplementary services.
The Visitor Location Register (VLR):
A Mobile station roaming in an MSC is controlled by the VLR in charge of that area. As 
soon as an MS appears in a location area it starts a location updating procedure. The 
MSC in charge of that area notices the registration and transfers to the VLR responsible 
for that area. A VLR may be responsible for one or more MSC. The VLR also contains 
information needed to handle the calls set up or received by the MSs registered in its 
database. In some cases, the VLR may have to obtain more information from the HLR of 
an MS. Numbers stored in the VLR are the IMSI, the MSISDN, the TMSI (if applicable), 
the location where the MS has been registered (used to call the station), and 
supplementary service parameters.
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The Mobile Services Switching Center (MSC):
This is an exchange which performs all the switching functions for MSs located in a 
geographical area designated as the MSC area. The difference between an MSC and a 
fixed network exchange is that the MSC has to consider the impact o f the allocation of 
radio resources and the mobile nature of the subscribers and has to perform, for example, 
procedures required for the location registration and those required for hand-over.
The Base Station System (BSS):
The BSS is a sub-system of the Base Station equipment (transceivers, controllers, etc...), 
which is viewed by the MSC through a single interface (A-interface) as being the entity 
responsible for communicating with Mobile Stations in a certain area. The radio 
equipment of a BSS may support one or more cells. A BSS may consist of one or more 
base stations where an Abis-interface is implemented. It consists of one Base Station 
Controller (BSC) and one or more Base Transceiver Station (BTS). The BSC is a 
network component of the PLMN with the functionality of controlling one or more BTS 
and a BTS is a network component that serves one cell.
The Gateway MSC (GMSC):
If the fixed network cannot interrogate the HLR in the case of an incoming call to the 
PLMN, the call is routed to an MSC. This MSC will interrogate the appropriate HLR and 
route the call to the MSC where the MS is located. The MSC which performs a routing 
function to the actual location of the MS is called the GMSC. The network operator 
decides if one MSC or all MSCs are to be designated as a GMSC.
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The SMS Gateway MSC (SMSGMSC):
This is the interface between the Mobile Network and the network that provides access to 
the short Message services center, for short messages to be delivered to the MS. Again, it 
is the choice of the network operator on which MSCs (one or all) to act as the 
SMSGMSC.
The Group Call Register (GCR):
The GCR is a database in charge of the management of attributes related to the 
establishment of Voice Broadcast Calls and Voice Group Calls. The GCR may be 
responsible for one or more MSCs. Each MSC involved in a voice group or broadcast call 
requests its proper voice group or broadcast call attributes from its related GCR by use of 
the voice group or broadcast call reference.
The Equipment Identity Register (EIR):
This is a database in charge of the management of the equipment identities of the MSs.
The Authentication Center (AuC):
This is associated with an HLR, and stores an identity key for each mobile subscriber 
registered with the associated HLR. This key is used to generate data that is used to 
authenticate the IMSI, and to cipher communication over the radio path between the 
mobile station and the network. The AuC communicates only with its associated HLR 
over the H-interface.
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The Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), shown in Figure 14, shows the basic 
configuration. In this figure the most general solution is described in order to define all 
the possible interfaces which can be found in any PLMN [34].
The specific implementation in each network may be different. Some functions may be 
implemented in the same equipment and some interfaces may become internal interfaces. 
In any case, the configuration of the PLMN must have no impact on the relationship with 
other PLMNs [34].
In Figure 14, all functions are considered implemented in different equipment. So all the 
interfaces are external and need the support of the MAP of the Signaling System No. 7 to 
exchange data necessary to support the mobile service. Since the configuration of a 
PLMN has no impact on any other PLMN, the signaling interfaces can be used between 
entities within a PLMN and between different PLMNs.
There are a number of interfaces as shown in the figure, some of which will be 
introduced in the following segment.
•  Interface between the HLR and the VLR ( D-interface): This interface is used to 
exchange the data related to the location of an MS and to manage the subscriber. 
The main service provided to the subscriber is the ability to set up or receive calls 
within the whole service area. The VLR informs the HLR on the registration of an 
MS managed by the latter and provides it with the relevant location information. 
The HLR sends to the VLR all the data needed to support the service to the MS.
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The HLR then calls the previous VLR to inform it that it can cancel the location 
registration of this station because of the roaming of the mobile. Exchanges of 
data may also occur if the mobile wants to change some data attached to its 
subscription or if a specific function is requested.
•  Interface between the HLR and the gsmSCF (J interface) . The interface is used by 
the gsmSCF to request information from the HLR and since support for this 
interface is a network operator option, the HLR may refuse to provide the 
information requested.
• Interface between the VLR and its associated MSC(s) (B-interface): The VLR is 
the location and management database for the MSs roaming in the area controlled 
by the associated MSC(s). When an MSC needs data related to a given MS 
currently located in its area, it interrogates the VLR. When the MS initiates a 
location update procedure with an MSC, the MSC informs the associated VLR 
which stores the relevant information in its tables. This procedure occurs when a 
mobile roams to another location area or if the subscriber activates a specific 
supplementary service or modifies some data attached to a service. The MSC 
transfers (via the VLR) the request to the HLR which stores these modifications 
and updates the VLR if needed.
• Interface between VLRs (  G-interface): The VLR fetches the IMSI from the 
previous VLR when an MS initiates a location updating procedure using a TMSI.
•  Interface between HLR and the MSC (C-interface): The gateway MSC has to 
interrogate the HLR of the called subscriber to obtain the roaming number of the 
called MS if the fixed network is unable to do so. To forward a short message to a
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mobile subscriber, the SMS Gateway MSC has to interrogate the HLR to obtain 
the MSC number where the MS is located.
• Interface between MSCs (E-interface): When an MS moves from one MSC 
covered area to the next during a call, a handover procedure has to be performed 
in order to continue the communication. So the MSCs involved have to be able to 
exchange data to initiate and then to realize the operation. This interface is also 
used to forward short messages.
• Interface between the MSC and the Base Station Systems (A-interface): This 
interface carries information concerning BSS management, call handling, and 
location management.
• Interface between MSC and EIR (F-interface): This interface is used in case an 
MSC needs to verify an IMEI. This is an internal interface.
4.3. NETWORK FUNCTIONS
There are a few network functions available that are required to support cellular 
operation. They are Location Registration, Handover, and Call Re-establishment. There 
are also additional network functions for call handling, for example, queuing, off-air-call- 
set-up, security related services, discontinuous reception, and discontinuous transmission.
Location Registration: is a way for PLMNs to keep track of their MSs in the system 
area. Location information is stored in functional units called location registers. Two of 
these registers that are of interest to us are the Home Location Register (HLR) and the
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Visitor Location Register (VLR). Procedures related to location registration comprise of 
the following: [45]
i. Location updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its location 
area has to be updated, i.e. the MS has received a location area identity which is 
different from that contained in its memory. In order to avoid unnecessary 
updating, the current location area identity should be stored in a non-volatile 
memory in the MS;
ii. Location cancellation which is used to delete an MS from a VLR;
iii. Periodic location updating which enables the location of stationary MSs to be 
confirmed at a rate determined by the operator;
iv. As a network option, IMSI detach/attach operation. When a MS has informed the 
network that it is IMSI detached, the network is aware that the subscriber is not 
active;
v. Routing updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its routing 
area has to be updated;
vi. Periodic routing updating which enables the location of stationary MSs to be 
confirmed at a rate determined by the operator;
vii. GPRS detach/attach operation. When a MS has informed the network that it is 
GPRS detached, the network is aware that the subscriber is not active;
viii. Cell updating which enables the MS to inform the network that its cell has been 
updated.
The procedures i) to iv) are defined for circuit switched services, and ii) and v) to viii) are 
defined for packet switched services. Combined procedures for circuit switched and
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packet switched services are also defined for GPRS. The procedure i) may be combined 
with v), iii) may be combined with vi) and iv) may be combined with vii).
Handover: Some cases that are required include handover between physical channels of 
the same Base Station System (BSS). This may be used when the physical channel 
carrying the call comes across interferences and when the channel or equipment carrying 
a call has to be taken out of service for repair or maintenance. Another case is handover 
between the BSSs of the same MSC or between BSSs of different MSCs of the same 
PLMN. The former case is used in order to ensure continuity of a connection as the MS 
moves from one BSS area to the next. For the case of handover between BSSs of 
different MSCs, two procedures are defined: basic handover procedure where the call is 
handed over from the controlling MSC (MSC-A) to another MSC (MSC-B), and 
subsequent handover procedure where the call is handed over from MSC-B to MSC-A or 
to a third MSC (MSC-B’).
Call reestablishment: This process is performed when a traffic channel (TCH) has been 
lost during the call (e.g. when a handover was not completed in time). Call re­
establishment is only performed on TCHs and only when a call is in the connected state.
Other network functions like queuing of MS originating and/or MS terminating calls at 
the BSS in addition to normal call handling queuing is feasible under the condition that 
for MS terminating calls the queuing does not conflict with abnormal release conditions 
in the fixed network. In general, calls that may have passed international circuits should
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not be queued. OfT-Air-Call-Set-Up (OACSU) may be implemented in PLMNs in order 
to increase the call handling capacity of the PLMN. Security related services are offered 
on the radio path by PLMNs:
•  Confidentiality o f the user identity: for the privacy of the identity of the 
subscribers. An intruder cannot identify which subscriber is using a certain 
resource on the radio path [45] since a temporary identity is used instead of the 
IMSI. In circuit switched circuits, the TMSI is a local number valid only in a 
given location area. The TMSI is allocated by the VLR and is sent to the MS in a 
ciphered mode (when available as a network option). As for packet switched 
networks, the packet temporary mobile subscriber identity (P-TMSI) is a local 
number valid only in a given routing area. It is allocated by SGSN and sent in 
ciphered mode when available.
•  User data confidentiality: provides confidentiality of anything transmitted on a 
traffic channel using encryption/decryption in the MS and BSS with a key that is 
calculated in both the MS and the network.
•  Signaling information element confidentiality: provides confidentiality of 
anything transmitted on a signaling channel where signaling information to 
control the service offered to a subscriber or connectionless user data can be 
encrypted/decrypted in the MS and BSS with a key calculated by both the MS and 
the network.
•  Discontinous reception: is a way of reducing battery consumption of MSs. This 
function must be supported by the network but is optional for MSs.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
•  Discontinous transmission: is a technique used to reduce overall interference level 
on the radio interface and to reduce MS battery consumption.
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5. OSI REFERENCE MODEL OBJECT DESCRIPTION
Section 5.1 of this chapter presents the formal object model o f the Open Systems 
Interconnection Reference Model (OSI-RM). A MODSIM simulation of this model is 
shown in Section 5.2, along with a description o f how a layer is implemented. Finally, 
Section 5.3 shows the generalized PVS code structure used for the application of formal 
methods to the model.
5.1. THE FORMAL OBJECT MODEL
An object model is thought of as a unifying concept. It helps us cope with the complexity 
inherent in many different systems. It offers a number of benefits that other models don't 
provide, such as re-use. An object model allows for re-use of parts or whole designs, 
leading to the creation of re-usable application frameworks. Also, using an object model 
produces a stable system built using stable intermediate forms. Thus, a system need not 
be completely redesigned in response to a minor or major change in requirements. Only 
the affected objects need to be dealt with at that point. Figure 15 shows the object model 
developed for the OSI-RM.

















Figure 15. Abstract formal object model of the OSI reference model
There are four objects portrayed in this model:
•  a Station object which resembles an open system consisting of a number of 
layers specified by the user,
•  a Layer object that has a Layer lD to identify which layer it is and a 
Station ID to identify which station it belongs to,
•  an SAP object responsible for the actual connection between two adjacent 
layers, and
•  a Physical connect object that acts as the Physical Layer in the OSI_RM and 
connects two or more systems together.
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The model focuses on the behavior of the communication within the OSI-RM, separating 
it from the implementation. Figure 16 shows an abstract view of two adjacent layer 
objects in the OSI-RM. The details of the layer objects will be discussed in more detail 





Figure 16. An abstract formal object view of two adjacent layers in the OSI-RM
5.2. SIMULATION OF THE OBJECT MODEL USING MODSIM
A use of the object model is demonstrated in the development of a simple network 
simulation in the object oriented simulation language MODSIM. The interconnectivity 
of the object architecture is demonstrated by passing messages, while no specific protocol 
is tested. A network is created using a number of systems (stations). Each system 
contains layers where each layer is connected to one or more layers (in this case, one 
layer above and one below). Each layer is also connected to one or more Service-Access-
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Points (SAP). The type of connection (either connection_mode or connectionlessjnode) 
is decided upon by the data packet passing through the system. If the mode is 
connection_mode, the SAP retains the knowledge of the data packet being sent and 
remains connected to the specified path awaiting its return. In the connectionlessjnode, 
the connection made between two layers via the SAP is discarded as soon as the data 
packet passes through. The maximum number of SAPs to be used in the simulation is 
decided upon by the user. The Physical connect object is used to simulate communication 
through the physical medium. Each layer is connected to zero or one such link.
Figure 17 shows partial code in MODSIM to create the network where Sarr is the array o f 
stations and Parr, is the physical layer connection between these stations.
NEW(SArr, l..s);
FOR i:= 1 TO s 
NEW(SArr[i]);
ASK SArr[i] TO SetStationID(i,n) ;
END FOR;
NEW(PArr, 1..s, 1..s);
FOR i := 1 TO s 
FOR j := 1 TO S 
IF i<>j
NEW(PArr[i][j]);




Figure 17. Network creation in MODSIM
The assumptions made in this simulation are that all the systems are physically connected 
to one another. Also a maximum number o f SAPs has to be specified at the beginning o f 
the simulation (for practical implementation issues). Since this is an abstract model
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simulation and there is no real protocol simulated, a pre-set delay has been added for an 
object passing through each layer to try and simulate the passage of time as it would be if 
a protocol existed.
Figure 18 shows how the layer object was modeled for simulation in MODSIM. The 
layer object has five methods, the purpose of which is to transfer a data object from one 
end of the open system to the other. Four methods are used to receive a data object from 
above or below and to transmit the data object up or down. These four methods interact 
with the SAP objects that acquire or deliver the data object. Depending on whether the 
communication is intended to be connection-mode or connectionlessjnode, the SAP 
assigns itself to the data object as connect-mode or no-connect-mode. If the mode is 
connect-mode, the data packet being sent is returned to the originating station via the 
same path used to send it. There is a fifth method called the shell method. This is the 
method that will be programmed by the user to contain the entities and functions needed 
for a particular protocol simulation.











Figure 18. Layer approach
So, using this model, the user need only program the contents of the subsystem (shown in 
Figure 19) for each layer into the communication framework and the message passing 
between the open systems is guaranteed.
TELL METHOD Shell (IN UD:UpDownType; IN X : AnyObject) ;
BEGIN
WAIT DURATION 4.0 
END WAIT;
IDA:=UD;
IF IDA = u
TELL SELF TO TransmitD(DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE
TELL SELF TO TransmitU(DArr[X.ObjID]);
END IF;
END METHOD;
Figure 19. Sub-system code (Shell Method)
Appendix A contains the MODSIM code for this simulation. Along with the code, is a 
text file that contains the simulation scenario. Any change needed in the testing of this 
simulation may be done in this text file.
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Figure 20 shows a simulation result for the transmission of six data packets through the 
Formal Model, some of which were in connection mode (the packet returns to its 
originating station).
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Figure 20. Simulation of six data packets through the OSI Formal Model
S3 CAPTURING THE OBJECT MODEL IN PVS
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a validation model is a formal model that defines the 
interactions of processes in a system. It does not resolve implementation details nor does 
it say how a message is to be transmitted, encoded, or sorted. By simplifying the problem 
in this way, we eliminate disturbing detail, avoid premature commitment to 
implementation, and focus on the essence of the problem at hand [26]. This idea of 
abstraction is achieved using object orientation, and formal techniques provide the means
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to precisely describe such abstractions[30]. Validation of open system communication, be 
it protocol specification or network communication, can thus be achieved horizontally 















Figure 21. Horizontal vs vertical verification of communication
The horizontal communication between the layers is used to define the specification of 
the network and its desired behavior. The vertical communication defines the 
implementation of the network via the interaction between layers. The relationship 
between two adjacent layers can be verified by verifying
A1 —> A2 = A1 —»Bl, Bl —» B2, B2 —> A2 (1)
where an initial assumption is made that the Bl - » B2 virtual communication is valid. Or 
it can be seen as
A = B + C + D (2)
This approach was decided upon in order to focus on the structure, which helps minimize 
re-proving.
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A generalized PVS code structure is composed of a function for each layer entity ( in this 
case there is only one entity per layer). This function accepts the record ‘state’ as an input 
and relevant layer protocol implementation code would be inserted by the user based on 









LayerA 1 entitytype: Atype, 
Layer B 1 entitytype: Btype, 




Layer_A2_entity_type: A type, 
Layer_B2_entity_type: B type, 







SAP: B A SAP type,
«]
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Layer A 1 _entity(s:state_type): state_type= ( )
Layer_A2_entity(s:state_type): state_type= ( )
Layer_Bl_entity(s:state_type): state_type=( )
Layer_B2_entity(s:state_type): state_type= ( )
Single_step(s: state_type): state_type=
(Layer_A 1 _entity(Layer_B 1 _entity(
Layer_B2_entity(Layer_A2_entity(Initial_state(s)))))
state(s:state_type): RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_step(s)
ELSE








The communication between the layers’ entities is achieved via the SAPs. For PVS 
implementation issues, these SAPs are a part of the state record. In the state record, there 
are two records, one for the MS side and the other for the Network side. Each side in 
turn is a record that contains records of the entities available for that side (in this case two 
layers, A and B). They also contain the SAP that connects Layers B to either the layer 
below or to the corresponding Layer B on the other side. The A_type and B_type records 
contain information about the SAP that connects that layer to the one above. It may also 
contain any other information relevant to the protocol implementation in PVS (e.g., state 
labels if the entity is a state machine). The single_step function calls the relevant entities 
in the implementation order (A1 B1 B2 A2). There is also the state function
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which contains a recursive loop that keeps calling the single_step function to satisfy a 
specific call request A similar set of specifications are to be used for the specification 
part (A1 -> A2) and these are used in the final communication proof stating that the 
communication along the horizontal path is equivalent to the communication along the 
vertical path.
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6. GSM RADIO INTERFACE LAYER 3 (RIL3)
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The Radio Interface Layer 3 [32] of the GSM protocol is presented as a protocol on 
which the work presented here can be applied. RIL3 is a protocol that deals with all 
aspects of radio signaling within the GSM network like channel allocation, connection 
and release. It also deals with call establishment and release via its Call control 
management sublayer. In this chapter, we will be using a segment of the R1L3 protocol 
which establishes the connection for a Mobile Originated Call Setup. This protocol will 
be specified and verified in PVS.
6.2. RADIO INTERFACE LAYER 3 (RIL3) DESCRIPTION
The Radio Interface Layer 3 is composed of three sub-layers: Radio Resource (RR), 
Mobility Management (MM), and Call Control Management (CCM). The RR sub-layer 
together with the Data Link Layer (Layer2) and the Physical Layer (Layer 1), provide the 
means for point to point radio connection on which the MM and CCM messages are 
carried. The CCM sub-layer is composed of three entities, the Call Control entity (CC), 
the Supplementary Services entity (SS), and the Short Message Services entity (SMS). 
Only the CC entity is of interest to us for the example used in our PVS proof. The RR 
protocol applies to the Air (Um) interface while the MM and CC interfaces apply 
between the MS and the MSC.
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The sub-layers have functions and protocols related to a common concept that is best 
explained using an object-oriented approach. The management of the RR connection 
deals with establishing, modifying, and releasing basic means of communication on the 
radio interface and through the radio sub-system. For the purposes of this research, 
communication on the RR sub-layer level is assumed to be guaranteed.
63. RIL3 SUBLAYER COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE
Figure 22 provides an overview of the object oriented structure of the Layer 3 RR sub­
layer. The RR sub-layer provides a service to the MM sub-layer. RR services are used 
for:
• establishing control channel connections
• releasing control channel connections
• control data transfer
• establishing traffic channel connection
• ciphering mode indication
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66








Figure 22. MM-RR sub-layer communicatioa (33|2
The MM sub-layer provides services to the CC, SS, and SMS entities in the CCM sub­
layer. Figure 23 shows the relevant connection structure.
MS Side Network Side






Figure 23. CCM-MM sub-layer communication [33|3
2-3 “© E T S I1999. further use, modification, redistribution is strictly prohibited. ETSI standards are 
available from publication@etsi.fr, and http://www.etsi.org/eds/eds.htm
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Figure 24. Overall communication structure for layer 3 messaging
The overall structure of the layer 3 communication is shown in Figure 24. It can be seen 
that there exists Service Access Points (SAPs) between adjacent sub-layers to facilitate 
communication between the sub-layers and also between the MS and Network CC enities 
of the CCM sub-layers and the entity itself (e.g., Mobile telephone and actual circuitry in 
the MSC). These SAPs contain routing functions that enable them to decide whether a 
message is to be passed right through to the next sub-layer or remain in the sub-layer for 
further processing.
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6.4. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL USING PVS 
An alteration to Figure 24 was perceived to apply the concept presented in Chapter 5 to 
the RIL3 sub-layer communication. Communication on the RR level is assumed to be 
correct and the PVS implementation deals with the MM and CCM (CC entity) sub-layers 
only. This is shown in Figure 25.









protocol V R R -S A P
Figure 25. Model for PVS Implementation of the communication between RIL3 sub-layers
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In the PVS implementation, the RR-SAP is implemented but only to provide a guaranteed 
communication so the MM sub-layer peer-to-peer protocol shown above would be valid. 
An example of a Mobile Originated Call Set-up procedure was used for the application of 
this concept. Figure 26 shows the call set-up procedure using the three sub-layers.
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Figure 26. Mobile originated call setup -  successful case (33)4
4 “© ETSI 1999. further use, modification, redistribution is strictly prohibited. ETSI standards are available 
from publication@etsi.fr, and http://www.etsi.org/eds/eds.htm
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6.4.1. RIL3 sub-layer functionality
As mentioned, Layer 3 of the GSM Network is composed of three sub-layers. Each sub­
layer is thought of as a State Machine that has input messages coming in from the SAP 
belonging to the layer above or the layer below and output messages going to the SAPs of 
the layer above or the layer below. These state machines are complete state machines 
that deal with every possible form of communication within these sub-layers. Not all of 
the functionality of the sub-layer state machines is used in Figure 26, and therefore the 
state machines used in our implementation were extracted out of the original state 
machines in order to fulfill our call setup requirements only. The state machines used for 
the CC and MM sub-layers are shown in Section 6.4.3.
The RIL3 ETSI specification [32] provided the state machines for the CC entity in the 
CCM sub-layer for both the MS and the Network sides. However, the only state machine 
found in the specification for the MM sub-layer was for the MS side. For the Network 
side, all that was found was a list of definitions for the states available in that sub-layer. 
So between RIL3 spec [32] and R1L3 general aspects [33], a state machine was deduced 
for the MM sub-layer Network side and is presented for this work.
6.4.2. Horizontal Specification Vs Vertical Implementation
Looking back on Chapter 5, to perform a horizontal vs. vertical validation of the model, it 
is required that the protocol specification be verified horizontally (specification) vs. 
vertically (implementation). To do this, Figure 26 needs to be interpreted in two different 
ways where part of the figure’s communication is assumed guaranteed. Figure 27 shows
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the altered MO call setup procedure. Some discrepancies were found when comparing 
Figure 26 to the worded description and the state machines for the sub-layers. These 
discrepancies were fixed in Figure 27, which is the call setup procedure used for the 
application of our model. The discrepancies were missing messages (MMCC Data 
Request (setup), and MNCC Sync Ind) on the MS side. This demonstrates that simply 
the act of formally specifying the protocol exposes problems.
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Figure 27. Fixed mobile originated call setup (implementadoa)
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For the implementation view of the procedure, all Data Link Layer communication is 
assumed to be valid and messages coming into MM sub-layer are assumed guaranteed. 
The specification view on the other hand assumes communication to be valid anywhere 
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6.43. State machines for the CC and MM sub-layers
The Figures 29 through 32 are the state machines for the CC entity in the CCM sub-layer 
and MM sub-layer for both the MS and the Network sides. These are four state machines:
CC-MS state machine(Figure 29): deals with the input messages coming in through the 
MMCC SAP from the layer below (MM sub-layer) or the MNCC SAP from the network 
entity (in this case the actual mobile phone on the Mobile Station side). It may also 
produce messages to either the layer above or the layer below.
CC-NET state machine(Figure 30): deals with the input messages coming in through 
the MMCC SAP from the layer below (MM sub-layer) or the MNCC SAP from the 
network entity (in this case the actual MSC on the Network side). It may also produce 
messages to either the layer above or the layer below.
MM-MS state machme(Figure 31): deals with the input messages coming in through the 
RR SAP from the layer below (RR sub-layer) or the MMCC SAP from the network entity 
(MM sublayer on the Mobile Station side). It may also produce messages to either the 
layer above or the layer below.
MM-NET state machine(Figure 32): deals with the input messages coming in through 
the RR SAP from the layer below (RR sub-layer) or the MMCC SAP from the network 
entity (MM sublayer on the Network side). It may also produce messages to either the 
layer above or the layer below.
The MM-NET state machine was missing from the RIL3 documentation and a word 
description of available states was used in deriving the state machine shown in Figure 32.
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Figure 32. MM-NET state machine ^
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6.5. DESCRIPTION OF PVS CODE
6.5.1. PVS implementation of the state machines
In the PVS implementation o f the state machines, a state record was used that contained 
information on the SAPs, the present states and the messages. It was discovered that PVS 
had a problem with seeing the change in the record’s present state and input message 
during the recursion, so Present state in/out and Message in/out elements had to be added 






n: { i:nat|i<40 & i>=0}, 
msg_in_MS: SAPmsg, 
msg_in_NET: SAP_msg, 
msgoutMS:  SAP msg, 
msgoutNET:  SAP_msg, 
m s g i n M M M S :  SAP msg, 
m s g i n M M N E T : SAP msg, 
msg_out_MM_MS: SAP msg, 
msg out MM NET: SAP_msg,
Pres in MM MS: M M statetype,
Pres out MM MS: MM state type,
Pres_in_MS: CC_state_type,
Pres out MS: C C statetype,
Pres_in_NET: CC_state_type,
Pres_out_NET: C C statetype,
Pres in MM N ET: MM state type,
Pres out MM NET: MM state type 
#]
This state record is used as an input to the state transition functions. The reason the state 
record contains information about both the MS and the Network sides, is to facilitate the 
assumption of communication on the RR level for the implementation and on the MM
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level for the specification. The communication between the state transition functions in 







Figure 33. Implementation view for PVS
Figure 34 shows the state transition functions’ view for the PVS specification code. For 
the specification, new state transition functions were used where communication coming 
from the MM sub-layer is assumed guaranteed.





Figure 34. Spedfication view for PVS
The data types used are SAP_msg which is an enumerated type of all possible messages 
in any of the three sub-layers.
SAP_msg: TYPE = {MNCC_Setup_Req, MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind, MNCC_Alert_Ind, 
MNCC_Setup_Cnf, MNCC_Setup_Ind, MNCC_Call_Proc_Req, 
MNCC_Alert_Req, MNCC_Setup_Rsp,
MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind, MNCC_Sync_Ind,
MMCC_Est_Req, MMCC_Est_Cnf, MMCC_Data_Req_setup, 
MMCC_Est_Ind_setup, MMCC_Call_Proc, 
MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc, MMCC_Data_Req_callproc, 





RR_Sync_Ind_res, RR_Est_Ind, RR_Sync_Req_ciph, 
RR_Sync_Req_res, RR_Sync_Cn f_c iph, RR_Sync_Cn f_res, 




RR_Data_Ind_setup, RR_Data_Req_callproc, Data_msg, 
No_Msg}
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There are also state types for the MM and the CC sub-layers which are basically all the 
relevant states for the example being used.
CC_state_type: TYPE = {Null, MM_Conpend, Call_Init, MO_Call_Proc,
Call_Delivered, Conn_Indic, Active}
MM_state_type: TYPE = {Idle, Wait_MOMM_Conn, Ciph_Mode_Init, Active,
Wait_RR_Conn}
The code is written in a way where it is very easy to increase state types or message types 
based on need for any application example. Similarly, the state transition code is written 
using IF statements and therefore simplifies any addition needed to the code.
An initial state was assumed to contain initial states for all the sub-layers and to have no 
messages on the SAPs.
Initial_state(s:state_type):



















(Pres_out_MS):= Null, (Pres_out_NET):= Null,
(Pres_in_MM_MS):= Idle, (Pres_out_MM_MS):= Idle,
(Pres_in_MM_NET):= Idle, (Pres out_MM_NET):= Idle,
(n):=30])
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The control state machine “Input_Contror was used to provide a testing ground for the 
whole system. It provides external messages that would normally come from the mobile 
phone on the MS side or the circuitry on the Network side. It can be seen from the state 
transition diagrams (Figures 29-32) that there exists some states where there is an option 
of messages coming in as inputs and each message produces a different state transition 
and output. Also, in Figure 28, after the Network side receives the MMCC_Sync_Cnf 
message on the MMCC_SAP, one of two messages can be sent, either MNCC_Alert_Req 
or MNCC_Setup_Rsp. If the AlertReq message comes first, the CC state changes to 
Call-delivered and an output of MMCC_Data_Req_alert is produced for the 
MMCC_SAP. After this alert message a Setup_Rsp message has to be provided to 
change the CC state from Call_delivered to Connect_Indic where it awaits the connect 
acknowledge message to go into Active state and produces an output of 
MMCC_Data_Req_connect for the MMCC_SAP. On the other hand, if the 
MNCC_Setup_Rsp message comes in first, the CC state goes straight from MO Call 
Proceeding to Connect_Indic where it awaits the connect acknowledge signal to go into 
active state and also produces the output of MMCC_Data_Req_connect for the 
MMCC SAP. This condition is implemented in the “Input Control” state machine as a 
Boolean variable that produces an Alert Req message followed by a Setup Rsp message 
if equal to FALSE and just a Setup_Rsp message if TRUE.
6.5.2. PVS implementation of the state transition functions
Transition through the state machines was done via recursion, a common tool in PVS to 
handle sequences of events. A recursive function steps through the state machines
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calling the next state using the present state and input as parameters. A natural variable n 
was used to limit the number of iterations through the recursive function in order to 
artificially terminate an infinite process to simplify the proof process.
The recursive function and the single step function used to perform the next state 
transition are as follows:
state(s:state_type): RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_step(s)
ELSE




IF n(s)=0 THEN single_stepl(s)
ELSE
statel(single_stepl(s WITH [(n):=n(s)-1])) 
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)
where state deals with the specification communication and statel deals with the 
implementation. The single step functions {single step for specification and single_stepl 
for implementation) merely call the appropriate state transition functions (CC_MS, 
MM_NET and CC_NET for implementation or CC_MS and CC_NET for 
specification) while forcing the next state value to be the present state and output 
message to be the input message. This can be seen as follows:
% This is a function to perform a single state transition through all 
% the state machines for the specification with the present values of s
single_step(s:state_type): state_type=
(state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (
state_transition_CC_MS_Spec (Input_Control ( 
s WITH [(msg_in_MS):= msg_out_MS(s), (msg_in_NET):= msg_out_NET(s) , 
(Pres_in_MS):= Pres_out_MS(s),(Pres_in_NET):=
Pres_out_NET(s) ] , test))))
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%This is a function to perform a single state transition through all 






state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(s WITH [ (msg_in_MS): =
msg_out_MS(s),
(msg_in_NET):= msg_out_NET (s),
(msg_in_MM_MS) := msg_out_MM_MS (s) , 




(Pres_in_MM_NET) : = Pres_out_MM_NET (s) ]
,test ))))))
It can be seen from the code that all the messages in/out and present states in/out are 
changed once at the beginning of the call and all the state transition functions are called 
using this single change so that all the state machines are actually considered to be 
working independently of each other.
The state transition functions are implemented such that in any given state, if the message 
coming into the appropriate SAP is invalid, the function re-produces the state record 
without changes. This functionality takes care of the conditions of what happens if the 
state machine is in the correct state but it gets an incorrect message input or if it gets a 
correct input but is in the wrong state. In reality, on entrance to each state, a timer is 
started and, if the correct message does not arrive within the allotted time, the state 
machine reverts to it’s initial condition and an appropriate error message is produced. 
This timer is not implemented in our PVS example due to the complication of real time
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implementation in PVS and due to the fact that it is not of importance for relaying the 
main aspect of this research.
6.6. FORMAL PROOF OF PVS CODE
The first step in formally proving the protocol performs the expected function is to 
typecheck the code. Typechecking ensures that there are no semantic errors such as 
undeclared names and ambiguous types. On typechecking the code in Appendix B, some 
Type Check Conditions (TCCs) occurred, two of which the prover could not prove 




NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES n(single_stepl(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l])) < n(s)
state_TCC3: LEMMA 
FORALL (s:state_type):
NOT n(s)=0 IMPLIES n(single_step(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-!]))< n(s)
State 1TCC1 ensures that the recursive measure n approaches its final value 0 so that the 
function terminates. Similarly, state_TCC3 ensures that the function terminates. Some 
intermediate LEMMAs were created to facilitate the proof of the above LEMMAs; these 
are shown below for the implementation communication. These LEMMAs basically go 
through each state transition and prove that the function terminates.
st_tran_CC_MS: LEMMA 
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(




n (state_transition_MM_MS (state_transition_CC_MS (Input_Control (s 
WITH [(n):=n(s)-l].test))))<n(s)





n (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transition_MM_MS (state_transition 




n (state_transition_CC_NET (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transitio 
n_MM_MS (state_transition_CC_MS (
Input_Control(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-1],test))))))<n(s)
and for the specification communication:
st_tran_CC_MS_spec: LEMMA 
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS_Spec(Input_Control (




n (state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (state_transition_CC_MS_Spec (
Input_Control(s WITH [(n):=n(s)- 
1],test))))<n(s)
The main communication of the system had to be proved via a LEMMA stating that the 
specification communication (i.e. using the CC only) produces the same final state as the 
implementation communication (i.e. using CC and MM). The communication 
specification is the virtual communication going across and the communication 
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To perform the proofs, a series of (rewrite) and (smash) commands were applied at 
appropriate instances. Both TCC LEMMAs and the communication LEMMA were 
proved. The proof is shown in Appendix C. It can be seen that these proofs are quite 
simple but repetitive and tedious. PVS allows automation for this type of proof where a 
pre-defined proof strategy is used which in turn simplifies re-proving due to any change 
made in the specification.
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7. CONCLUSION
An abstract object-oriented formal model of the Open Systems Interconnection- 
Reference Model (OSI-RM) [1] was presented to support the development of simulations 
and formal methods applied to layered network protocols. It is a re-usable model that has 
successfully been applied to simulation by simulating the communication between the 
layers in an abstract manner. It has also been applied to formal methods by formally 
specifying a Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM) protocol and verifying 
communication with the layered structure.
7.1. BENEFITS OF THE FORMAL OBJECT MODEL
One of the recognized strengths of the object-oriented paradigm is that a common core of 
basic ideas can support modeling at all levels of abstraction [13]. The information hiding 
principle is naturally supported; at the informal level of description, the concept of an 
object is very common. A design description and implementation framework supporting 
this concept would lead to more readable specifications, and properties, which are 
defined for general types of objects, can be inherited by objects in a sub-class.
Formal methods gain from object-oriented engineering concepts since it makes 
mathematical models easier to handle. On the other hand formal description techniques 
enhance the understanding of the object-oriented models. This is due to the un-ambiguity 
of the formal specification process, which also promotes the concept of re-use o f model 
components.
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There are a few advantages from taking an object-oriented approach in simulation. These 
include the naturally supported information hiding principle, simplification of the 
computer programming tasks achieved through the fact that each object is responsible for 
a specific task; also object oriented designs reduce the risk of building complex systems 
since they are developed to evolve incrementally from smaller ones and yield smaller 
systems through the re-use of common mechanisms.
The model focuses on the behavior of the communication within the OSI-RM, separating 
it from the implementation. The concept of abstraction used in the model assists in the 
avoidance of pre-mature commitment to protocol detail and enables structure re-use and 
verification of communication within the structure.
7.2. APPLICATION OF THE OBJECT MODEL TO SIMULATION
The object model was simulated using MODSIM III, modeling the communication 
between the layers. This application proved successful through the simulation of several 
scenarios that were tested using connection mode and connectionless_mode to show 
successful communication between stations throughout the network. An abstract 
approach was used by not applying the model to a particular protocol and a set time delay 
was inserted to portray the effect o f a protocol being implemented. This way, protocol 
designers may use this model for protocol simulation focusing more on the problem at 
hand while guaranteeing communication within the layered structure.
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73. APPLICATION OF THE OBJECT MODEL TO FORMAL METHODS
PVS was used to show the applicability of the object model to formal methods by 
formally specifying and verifying a GSM protocol. The abstract design of the model 
allowed us to remove unnecessary detail not pertaining to communication issues and 
hence simplify the proof. This application of the model to a GSM protocol has proved to 
be successful in two aspects. The first was showing the existence of discrepancies 
between the worded specifications [32, 33] and the fact that an important figure of the 
MM-NET state machine was missing. The second aspect was that the communication 
was verified using the abstract formal model structure of the OSI Reference Model.
7.4. GSM DISCREPANCIES
Although the worded description of the available states (not the functionality of the 
machine) was present in the documentation, the lack presence of the MM-NET state 
machine figure would lead to the an increased difficulty in the implementation of this 
layer protocol. The state machine was deduced using other available state machines (that 
dealt with multiple layers) and the worded description to enable the performance of this 
research. Other discrepancies found were mainly messages that would be sent over the 
communication link that were present in the worded specification [32] and not in the 
Mobile Network Arrow diagram [33] of the Mobile Originated Call Setup procedure 
which was the protocol segment used. Many other discrepancies were found in the 
naming of states and entities going from one specification to the next as well as 
differences in the general layout of state machines within one document [32].
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7.5. FINAL COMMENTS
Formal methods have been seen in the past as being somewhat difficult and time 
consuming. This research shows the need for the formal specification of all 
communication protocols to support a clear understanding of these protocols and to 
provide consistency in their implementations. Combining object oriented techniques with 
formal methods in the development of the formal object model allowed for the re-use of 
this model when applied to any layered network structure. This was shown in the 
example used where GSM is a three layer network structure as opposed to the seven layer 
structure of the OSI-RM. It was also shown that formal specifications identify most 
discrepancies like omissions and inconsistencies in the requirements statements. Proofs 
only need to be applied to sensitive areas of the design where problem areas may arise. 
Simulation becomes easier to build for the study of timing issues when using a common 
model given the limitations of formal methods.
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{ * * * * * * * * * * * * *
File: MNetwork.mod 
Created: May 31st, 2000 
Modified:
Written by: Rasha 
Purpose: Main Program File. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
}
MAIN MODULE Network;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject,DArr;
FROM Layer IMPORT LayerObj;
FROM Test IMPORT TestObj;
FROM Station IMPORT StationObj,SArr;
FROM PhysConnect IMPORT PhysConnectObj,PArr;
FROM SAPMod IMPORT SAPObj;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime, StartSimulation, StopSimulation;







LayerlD, StationID, DestID,n ,s ,i ,j,k, connectMode: INTEGER; 
ch:CHAR;





ASK inputfile TO Open( "network_data.txt", Input);
FOR i:= 1 TO 5
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
END FOR;
OUTPUT;




ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(s);
OUTPUT ("The number of stations used is : ", s) ; 
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(n);
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OUTPUTCThe number of layers per station is : ", n) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(k);
OUTPUT ("The number of objects to be sent is : ", k);
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine (textline) ;
NEW(DArr, l..k);
NEW(SArr, 1..S);
FOR i:= 1 TO s 
NEW(SArr[i]);
ASK SArr[i] TO SetStationlD(i.n);
END FOR;
NEW(PArr, l..s, l..s);
FOR i:= 1 TO s 
FOR j : = 1 TO s 
IF ioj
NEW(PArr[i] [j] ) ;




FOR i:= 1 TO k
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(LayerlD);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(StationID);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt(DestID);
ASK inputfile TO Readlnt (connectMode) ;
ASK inputfile TO ReadReal(time);
ASK inputfile TO ReadLine(textline);
NEW(DArr[i]);
ASK DArr[i] TO SetAnyObjID(LayerlD, StationID,DestID, i, StationID) 
ASK DArr[i] TO SetObj ConnectMode (connectMode) ;
TELL T TO TestComm(DArr[i] , SArr [StationID] .LArr [LayerlD] ) IN time; 
OUTPUT;
OUTPUT("For Object ", DArr[i] .ObjID, * : SimTime is : ", time, " 
Connect mode is : ", connectMode , " (1 - Connect ; 2 - No
Connect)");






OUTPUT(“... .Hit Any Key to terminate") ; 
ch:=ReadKey;
END MODULE.
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{ * * * * * * * * * * * * *
File: DAnyObj ect.mod 
Created: May 31st, 2000 
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject definition File, this will be 
interpreted as a data object in the future 
********+****
DEFINITION MODULE DataObject;
FROM SAPMod IMPORT SAPObj;
VAR





ObjID, SAPID: INTEGER; 
connectMode: INTEGER;
ASK METHOD ObjInit();
ASK METHOD SetAnyObj ID (IN LID, SID, DID, OID, ORID : INTEGER) 
ASK METHOD SetAnyObjLayerlD(IN LID: INTEGER);
ASK METHOD SetAnyObjStationID(IN SID:INTEGER);
ASK METHOD DisplaylDs();
ASK METHOD SetAnyObjObjID(IN OID: INTEGER);
ASK METHOD SetObjConnectMode(IN connectmode: INTEGER);
ASK METHOD SetAnyObjSAPID(IN SAPid: INTEGER);
END OBJECT; 
END MODULE.
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£ * * * * * * * * * * * * *
File: IAnyObject.mod 
Created: May 31st, 2000 
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject implementation File, this will be
interpreted as a data object in the future »***•*»**<
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE DataObject;
OBJECT AnyObject;





Ob j ID: = OID;
OrigID:=ORID;
END METHOD;










OUTPUT("Layer_ID = ", LayerlD, " , Station_ID = ", StationID, 
Dest_ID = ", DestID);
END METHOD;
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File: DLayer.mod 
Created: May 31st, 2000 
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject definition File, this will be 
interpreted as a data object in the future 
* * * * * * * * * * * * *  }
DEFINITION MODULE Layer;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject, DArr; 
FROM SAPMod IMPORT SAPObj;
FROM Station IMPORT StationOb j ;
FROM Layer IMPORT LayerObj;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime;
TYPE
UpDownType=(u ,d ); 
LayerObj = OBJECT;




SAP : SAPObj ;
ASK METHOD SetLayerlD (IN LID, SID : INTEGER; IN S: StationObj) 
TELL METHOD ReceiveFromU(IN X : AnyObject);
TELL METHOD ReceiveFromD(IN X : AnyObject);
TELL METHOD TransmitU(IN X : AnyObject);
TELL METHOD TransmitD(IN X : AnyObject);
TELL METHOD Shell (IN UD: UpDownType; IN X : AnyObject);
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
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£ * * * * * * * * * * * * *
File: ILayer.mod 
Created: May 31st, 2000 
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create an AnyObject definition File, this will be 
interpreted as a data object in the future 
* * * * * * * *  >
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Layer;
FROM PhysConnect IMPORT PArr;
FROM station IMPORT SArr;
OBJECT LayerObj;











IF X <> NILOBJ
ASK DArr[X.ObjID] TO SetAnyObjLayerlD(LayerlD);
OUTPUT(" LayerlD = ", LayerlD," StationID = ", StationID, 
" RFU Object ", X.ObjID);
TELL SELF TO Shell(UD,DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE
OUTPUT("Object not received in Layer", LayerlD);
END IF;
END METHOD;





IF X <> NILOBJ 
IF LayerlDol
ASK DArr[X.ObjID] TO SetAnyObjLayerlD(LayerlD) ;
OUTPUT(" LayerlD = ", LayerlD," StationID = ",
StationID, ’ RFD Object ", X.ObjID);
TELL SELF TO Shell(UD,DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE
ASK DArr [X.Obj ID] TO SetAnyObjStationID(X.DestID) ;
OUTPUT(" LayerlD = ", LayerlD," StationID = ",
StationID, " RFD Object ", X.ObjID);
TELL SELF TO Shell(UD,DArr[X.ObjID]);
END IF;
ELSE
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OUTPUT("Object not received in Layer", LayerlD);
END IF;
END METHOD;




FOR i := 1 TO ST.maxSAPs 
IF (X.SAPID=0)
ASK ST.SAP[i] TO SetSAPAnyObjID(X);
ASK DArr [X.ObjID] TO SetAnyOb j SAPID (ST. SAP [i] .SAPID) ;
ELSE
ASK ST. SAP [X. SAPID] TO SetSAPAnyObj ID (DArr [X.ObjID]) ;
END IF;
END FOR;
IF LayerlD <> ST.nl
TELL ST.SAP[X.SAPID] TO
SendUp (ST.LArr[LayerID+1 ] , DArr[X .ObjID]) ;
ELSE
OUTPUT;
OUTPUT("Layer7 reached for Object ", X.ObjID, " Connect Mode 
: ", X . connectMode, " SimTime ", SimTime () ) ;
OUTPUT;
IF (X .connectMode=1) AND (X.OrigID<>X.DestID)
ASK DArr[X.ObjID] TO
SetAnyObj ID (X . LayerlD,X.StationID,X. OrigID, X . Obj ID, 
X.OrigID);
TELL ST.SAP[X.SAPID] TO SendDown(ST.LArr[LayerlD- 
1],DArr[X.ObjID]);
ELSE IF (X.connectMode=l) AND (X.OrigID=X.DestID)











FOR i := 1 TO ST.maxSAPs 
IF (X.SAPID=0)
ASK ST.SAP[i] TO SetSAPAnyObjID(X);
ASK DArr [X.ObjID] TO SetAnyObjSAPID(ST.SAP[i] .SAPID) ; 
ELSE




TELL ST. SAP [X.SAPID] TO SendDown (ST. LArr [LayerID-






SendAcross (SArr [DestID],DArr[X.ObjID]) ;
END IF;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD Shell (IN UD: UpDownType; IN X : AnyObject);
BEGIN
WAIT DURATION 4.0 
END WAIT;
IDA:=UD;
IF IDA = u
TELL SELF TO TransmitD(DArr[X.ObjID] ) ;
ELSE
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£  * * * * * * * * * * * * *
File: DStation.mod 
Created: May 31st, 2000 
Modified:
Written by: Rasha
Purpose: Create a Station definition File 
* * * * * * * * * * * * *  }
DEFINITION MODULE Station;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject;
FROM Layer IMPORT LayerObj ;
FROM SAPMod IMPORT SAPObj;
VAR












StationID, maxSAPs : INTEGER; 
: ARRAY INTEGER OF LayerObj; 
: ARRAY INTEGER OF SAPObj;
INTEGER);
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£ * * * * * * * * * * * * *
File: IStation.mod 
Created: May 31st, 2000 
Modified:
Written by: Rasha




ASK METHOD SetStationID(IN SID, nLayers: INTEGER); 
BEGIN
StationID:= SID; 
nl := nLayers ;








FOR n:= 1 TO nl 
NEW(LArr[n]);
ASK LArr[n] TO SetLayerID(n,StationID,SELF); 
END FOR;
FOR i := m DOWNTO 1 
FOR j:= 1 TO maxSAPs 
NEW(SAP[j]);






Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
no
File: DSAP.mod 
Created:May 31st, 2000 
Modified: June 2nd, 2000 
Written by: Rasha Morsi
Purpose: Create a Connect definition File.
}
DEFINITION MODULE SAPMod;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject,DArr;
FROM Layer IMPORT LayerObj;
TYPE
SAPObj = OBJECT;
LT, LF, SAPID, ObjID, connectMode: INTEGER;
X: AnyObject;
LayerFrom, LayerTo: LayerObj;
ASK METHOD SetSAPID(IN LayerFrom, LayerTo: LayerObj; IN SAPid:
INTEGER);
TELL METHOD SendUpdN LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X: AnyObject);
TELL METHOD SendDown(IN LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X: AnyObject); 
ASK METHOD SetSAPAnyObj ID (IN X: AnyObject);
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.




Created:May 31st, 2000 
Modified: June 2nd, 2000 
Written by: Rasha Morsi











TELL METHOD SendUpdN LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X: AnyObject); 
BEGIN
TELL LayerTo TO ReceiveFromD (DArr [X.ObjID]) ;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD SendDown(IN LayerTo: LayerObj; IN X : AnyObj ect); 
BEGIN
TELL LayerTo TO ReceiveFromU (DArr [X.ObjID]) ;
END METHOD;
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File: DPhysConnect.mod 
Created:May 31st, 2000 
Written by: Rasha Morsi
Purpose: Create a Physicel Connect definition File. 
    }
DEFINITION MODULE PhysConnect;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject,DArr; 
FROM Layer IMPORT LayerObj;
FROM Station IMPORT StationObj;
VAR




StationFrom , StationTo : StationObj;
SF, ST : INTEGER;
ASK METHOD SetPhysConnectID(IN StationFrom, StationTo:StationObj) 
TELL METHOD SendAcross (IN StationTo: StationObj ; IN X: AnyObject);
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
File: IPhysConnect. mod 
Created:May 31st, 2000 
Written by: Rasha Morsi
Purpose: Create a Physicel Connect definition File.
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE PhysConnect;
OBJECT PhysConnectObj





TELL METHOD SendAcross (IN StationTo:StationObj; IN X: AnyObject); 
BEGIN








Created: April 29th, 1999 
Written by: Rasha, Damayanthi, Prahalad 
Purpose: Create a Test definition File. 
* * * * * *  * )
DEFINITION MODULE Test;
FROM DataObject IMPORT AnyObject,DArr;
FROM Layer IMPORT LayerObj;
FROM Station IMPORT StationObj;
FROM SAPMod IMPORT SAPObj;
TYPE
TestObj = OBJECT;
LayerlD, StationID, DestID : INTEGER; 
L : LayerObj;
X: AnyObject;




Created: April 29th, 1999
Written by: Rasha, Damayanthi, Prahalad
Purpose: Create a Test Implementation File.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *  J
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Test;
OBJECT TestObj;
TELL METHOD TestComm(IN X: AnyObject; IN L: LayerObj); 
BEGIN
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typedefs : THEORY 
BEGIN
CC_state_type: TYPE = {Null, MM_Conpend, Call_Init, MO_Call_Proc,
Call_Delivered, Conn_Indic, Active}
MM_state_type: TYPE = {Idle, Wait_MOMM_Conn, Ciph_Mode_Init, Active,
Wai t_RR_Conn}
SAP_msg: TYPE = {MNCC_Setup_Req, MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind, MNCC_Alert_Ind, 




MMCC_Est_Req, MMCC_Est_Cnf, MMCC_Data_Req_setup, 
MMCC_Est_Ind_setup, MMCC_Call_Proc, 
MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc, MMCC_Data_Req_callproc, 




RR_Est_Req, RR_Est_Cnf, RR_Sync_Ind_ciph, 
RR_Sync_Ind_res, RR_Est_Ind, RR_Sync_Req_ciph, 














% For every sublayer, there is a record of sublayer states and message 





































% A state can be a record of MS sublayers and states and NET sublayers 
% and states.
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s : VAR state_type 
st:VAR state_type 
y: VAR bool
Initial_state: TYPE = state_type 
i: nat




Pres_in_MS (s) =Null AND msg_in_MS (s) = MNCC_Setup_Req THEN 
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= MM_Conpend, (MS)(MM)(SAP)(msg):=
MMCC_Es t_Req,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= MMCC_Es t_Req, (Pres_out_MS):= MM_Conpend]
ELSIF







Pres_in_MS (s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc 
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_MS):= MO_Call_Proc,
(MS) (CC)(SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s)=Call_Init AND msg_in_MS(s)= MMCC_Data_Ind_alert 
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS):= Call_Delivered,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Alert_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_connect 
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connacJc,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= MMCC_Data_Req_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s)= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS(s )= MMCC_Sync_Ind 
THEN
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ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) =MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS(s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_connect 
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack, 
(msg_out_MM_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) = MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_alert 
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS):= Call_Delivered,





s WITH ((MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack, 
(msg_out_MM_MS) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) = Active AND msg_in_MS (s) = Data_msg THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):=Data_msg, (msg_out_MS):= Data_msg] 
ELSE s 
END IF





Pres_in_NET(s)=Null AND msg_in_NET(s) = MMCC_Est_Ind_setup THEN 
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Call_Init,
(Pres_out_NET):= Call_Init,
(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Ind,
(msg_out_NET):= MNCC_Setup_Ind]
ELSIF




(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s)=Call_Init AND msg_in_NET(s) = MNCC_Call_Proc_Req 
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_NET):= MO_Call_Proc,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_callproc, 
(msg_out_MM_NET) := MMCC_Data_Req_ca 1 lproc ]
ELSIF











Pres_in_NET (s) =MO_Call_Proc AND
msg_in_NET (s) = MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_NET):= M0_Call_Proc]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s) =M0_Call_Proc AND msg_in_NET (s) = MNCC_Alert_Req 
AND msg(SAP(MM(NET(s) ) ) ) = MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN





Pres_in_NET (s) =M0_Call_Proc AND msg_in_NET (s) = MNCC_Setup_Rsp
AND msg(SAP(MM(NET(s))))= MMCC_Sync_Cnf
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Conn_Indic,
(Pres_out_NET):= Conn_Indic,
(NET)(MM)(SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_connect, 
(msg_out_MM_NET):= MMCC_Da ta_Req_connec t]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s) =Call_Delivered AND
msg_in_NET(s)= MNCC_Setup_Rsp
THEN





Pres_in_NET(s)= Conn_Indic AND msg_out_MM_NET(s)= 
RR_Data_Ind_connack
AND msg_out_NET (s) = MMCC_Da t a_Req_c onnec t
THEN
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ELSIF Pres_in_NET(s)= Active AND msg_in_NET(s)= 
MNCC_Setup_Compl_Ind 
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= Data_msg]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s) = Active AND msg_in_NET (s) = Data_msg 
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) :=Data_msg, (msg_out_MM_NET) : = 
Data_msg,
(msg_out_NET):= Data_msg, (Pres_out_NET):= Active]
ELSIF










Pres_in_MM_MS (s) =Idle AND msg_in_MM_MS (s) = MMCC_Est_Req 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_RR_Conn, (MS) (SAP) (msg) : = 
RR_Est_Req,




Pres_in_MM_MS(s)= Wait_RR_Conn AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Est_Req 
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Est_Cnf, (msg_out_MM_MS) : =
RR_Est_Cnf]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s)=Wait_RR_Conn AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Est_Cnf 
THEN






ms g_ i n_MM_MS(s)= RR_Sync_Ind_ciph
THEN




(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Sync_Cnf_ciph,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= RR_Sync_Cnf_ciph]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s ) = Active AND msg_in_MM_MS (s) = RR_Data_Ind_alert
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THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_alert,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_alert]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_MS (s) = RR_Data_Ind_callproc 
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC__Data_Ind_callproc]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s)= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS(s )= RR_Data_Ind_connect 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connect,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_MS (s) = MMCC_Data_Req_setup 
THEN






Pres_in_MM_MS(s)= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS{s)= MMCC_Data_Req_connack 
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (SAP) (msg):= RR_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MM_MS):= RR_Data_Req_connack,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Data_Ind_connack,
(msg_out_MM_NET) : = RR_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_MS(s)= RR_Sync_Ind_res 
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_MM_NET) : = RR_Sync_Cnf_res,
(Pres_out_MM_MS) : =Active,
(msg_out_MM_NET):= RR_Sync_Cnf_res,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync._Ind,
(msg_out_MS):= MMCC_Sync_Ind,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) : =RR_Sync_Cnf_res]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_MS(s)= Active AND msg_in_MM_MS(s)= Data_msg 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) : =Data_msg, (msg_out_MM_MS) : = Data_msg, 
(msg_out_MS):= Data_msg]
ELSIF










Pres_in_MM_NET (s) =Idle AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = RR_Est_Ind THEN
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S WITH [ (NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_MOMM_Conn,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) := Wait_MOMM_Conn]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Wait_MOMM_Conn AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) =RR_Est_Ind
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(MM)(Pres_s):= Ciph_Mode_Init,
(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Ciph_Mode_Init,




Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Ciph_Mode_Init AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = 
RR_Sync_Cnf_ciph
THEN
s WITH [(NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_MOMM_Conn,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) : = Wait_MOMM_Conn]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s) =Wai t_MOMM_Conn AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = 
RR_Data_Ind_setup
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Idle,
(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Idle]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s) =Idle AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = RR_Data_Ind_setup
THEN





Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) =
MMCC_Data_Req_callproc
THEN






Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = 
MMCC_Data_Req_connect
THEN
s WITH [(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Active,
(NET)(SAP)(msg):= RR_Data_Req_connect,
(msg_out_MM_NET) := RR_Data_Req_connect,
(MS) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Data_Ind_connect,
(msg_out_MM_MS) := RR_Data_Ind_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = 
MMCC_Data_Req_alert
THEN
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s WITH [ (Pres_out_MM_NET) : = Active,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := RR_Data_Req_alert,




Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = 
MMCC_Data_Ind_connack
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
(msg_in_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack,
(Pres_out_MM_NET):= Active,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = MMCC_Sync_Req
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (MM) (Pres_s) := Wait_RR_Conn,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) : = Wai t_RR_C onn,




Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Wai t_RR_Conn AND
msg_in_MM_NET(s)= RR_Sync_Cnf_res
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= MMCC_Sync_Cnf,
(NET)(MM) (Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) : = Active,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync_Cnf]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MM_NET (s) = Active AND msg_in_MM_NET (s) = Data_msg
THEN
s WITH [ (NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) :=Data_msg, (NET) (SAP) (msg) : =Data_msg, 
(MS) (SAP) (msg) := Data_msg, (msg_out_MM_NET) := Data_msg, 
(msg_out_MM_MS) : = Data_msg]
ELSIF










Pres_in_MS (s) =Null AND msg_in_MS (s) = MNCC_Setup_Req THEN 
s WITH [ (MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := MM_Conpend, (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) : =
MMCC_Es t_Req,
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(msg_out_MS):= MMCC_Est_Req, (Pres_out_MS):= MM_Conpend]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s ) = MM_Conpend AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Est_Req 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Est_Cnf,
(msg_out_MS) : = MMCC_Est_Cnf ]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) = MM_Conpend AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Est_Cnf 
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC) (Pres_s):=Call_Init,
(Pres_out_MS ):= Call_Init,




Pres_in_MS(s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS(s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_MS):= MO_Call_Proc,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s ) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_alert 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS) := Call_Delivered,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Alert_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS(s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_MS(s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_connect 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Active,
(Pres_out_MS) : = Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MS) : = MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) = MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Sync_Ind 
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (CC)(Pres_s) := MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_MS):= MO_Call_Proc,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Sync_Ind]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) =MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Data_Ind_connect 
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Active,
(Pres_out_MS) := Active,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Setup_Cnf,
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_MS) : = MMCC_Data_Req_connack,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Data_Ind_connack]
ELSIF
Pres_in_MS (s) = MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_MS (s ) = MMCC_Data_Ind_alert 
THEN
s WITH [(MS) (CC) (Pres_s) := Call_Delivered,
(Pres_out_MS) := Call_Delivered,
(MS) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Alert_Ind]
ELSIF
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Pres_in_MS(s)= Call_Delivered AND
msg_in_MS (s) = MMCC_Dat a_ Ind_c onnec t
THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,
(Pres_out_MS):= Active,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= MNCC_Setup_Cnf,




Pres_in_MS (s) = Active AND msg_in_MS (s ) = Data_msg THEN
s WITH [(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):=Data_msg, (msg_out_MS):= Data_msg] 
ELSE s 
END IF
state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (s: state_type) : state_type=
IF
Pres_in_NET(s)=Null AND msg_in_NET(s)= MMCC_Est_Ind_setup THEN 









(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s) =Call_Init AND msg_in_NET(s) = MNCC_Call_Proc_Req 
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= MO_Call_Proc,
(Pres_out_NET):= MO_Call_Proc,






s WITH [(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc,
(msg_out_MS) := MMCC_Data_Ind_callproc,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync_Req,
(msg_out_NET) := MMCC_Sync_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s)= MO_Call_Proc AND msg_in_NET(s)= MMCC_Sync_Req 
THEN
s WITH [ (MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := MMCC_Sync_Ind,




Pres_in_NET (s) =MO_Call_Proc AND msg (SAP (MM (NET (s) ) ) ) = MMCC_Sync_Cnf 
AND msg_in_NET(s)= MNCC_Alert_Req
THEN
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s WITH [(MS)(MM) (SAP)(msg):= MMCC_Data_Ind_alert,










msg_in_NET (s) =MMCC_Da t a_Req_connec t
THEN






s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Conn_Indic,
(Pres_out_NET) : = Conn_Indic,
(NET)(MM)(SAP) (msg):= MMCC_Data_Req_connect]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s)=Conn_Indic AND msg_in_NET(s)= MMCC_Data_Ind_connack 
THEN
s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):= Active,




Pres_in_NET(s)= Active AND msg_in_NET(s)= Data_msg THEN




(MS)(SAP)(msg):= Data_msg, (msg_out_NET):= Data_msg, 
(msg_out_MS):= Data_msg, (msg_in_MM_NET):= Data_msg, 
(msg_out_MM_NET):= Data_msg, (msg_in_MM_MS):= Data_msg, 
(msg_out_MM_MS):= Data_msg, (Pres_in_MM_MS):= Active, 
(Pres_in_MM_NET) := Active, (Pres_out_MM_MS) : = Active,
(Pres_out_MM_NET) := Active, (NET) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Active,
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(MS) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Active, (Pres_in_MS) : =Active, 




Input_Control(s :state_type, x :bool): state_type=
IF




s WITH [(msg_out_MS):= MNCC_Setup_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s)= Call_Init AND msg_in_NET(s)= MNCC_Setup_Ind 
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_NET) := MNCC_Call_Proc_Req]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s) = MO_Call_Proc AND msg_out_NET(s)= MMCC_Sync_Cnf 
THEN 
( IF x = FALSE 
THEN
s WITH [ (msg_out_NET) : = MNCC_Alert_Req ]
ELSE
S WITH [ (msg_out_NET) := MNCC_Setup_Rsp ]
ENDIF)
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s) =Call_Delivered AND 
msg (SAP (MM (NET (s)) )) =MMCC_Data_Req_alert 
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= MNCC_Setup_Rsp]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET (s) = Conn_Indic AND msg_in_NET (s) = MNCC_Setup_Rsp 
THEN
s WITH [(msg_out_NET):= msg(SAP(MM(NET(s))))]
ELSIF
Pres_in_NET(s)= Conn_Indic AND msg_in_NET(s)= MNCC_Alert_Req 
THEN




s: TYPE = state_type 
st: TYPE= state_type
Initial_state(s:state_type): s = (s WITH [(NET)(CC)(Pres_s):=Null,
(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):=Null,
(NET) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Idle, (MS) (MM) (Pres_s) :=Idle, 
(NET) (CC) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(MS)(CC)(SAP)(msg):= No_Msg, %MNCC_Setup_Req, 
(MS) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(NET) (MM) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(NET) (SAP) (msg) := No_Msg,
(MS) (SAP)(msg):= No_Msg,
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(msg_in_MS):= No_Msg,







(Pres_in_MS):=Null, (Pres_in_NET):= Null, 
(Pres_out_MS):= Null, (Pres_out_NET):= Null,
(Pres_in_MM_MS): = Idle, (Pres_out_MM_MS):= Idle 
(Pres_in_MM_NET) : = Idle, (Pres_out_MM_NET): =
Idle,
(n):=30])
Final_state(st:state_type) : st = (st WITH [ (NET) (CC) (Pres_s) : =Active,
(MS)(CC)(Pres_s):=Active,



































(Pres_out_MS):= Active, (Pres_out_NET):= Active, 
(Pres_in_MM_MS):= Active, (Pres_out_MM_MS):=
Active,





% test is a test value to make the transitions go through both cases of 
% input messages
test: bool
% This is a function to perform a single state transition through all 
the
% state machines for the implementation with the present values of s
single_step(s:state_type): state_type=
(state_transition_CC_NET_Spec (
state_transition_CC_MS_Spec (Input_Control ( 
s WITH [(msg_in_MS):= msg_out_MS (s) , (msg_in_NET) := msg_out_NET(s), 
(Pres_in_MS) := Pres_out_MS (s) , (Pres_in_NET) : =
Pres_out_NET(s)
],test))))
% This is a function to perform a single state transition through all 
the
% state machines for the implementation with the present values of s





state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(s WITH [ (msg_in_MS): = 
msg_out_MS(s) ,
(msg_in_NET):= msg_out_NET(s),
(msg_in_MM_MS) : = msg_out_MM_MS (s) ,
(msg_in_MM_NET) : = msg_out_MM_NET (s) ,
(Pres_in_MS):= Pres_out_MS(s ),
(Pres_in_MM_MS) : = Pres_out_MM_MS (s) ,
(Pres_in_NET):= Pres_out_NET(s ),
(Pres_in_MM_NET) := Pres_out_MM_NET (s) ]
.test ))))))
state(s:state_type) : RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_step(s)
ELSE
state(single_step(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l]))
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)
statel(s:state_type) : RECURSIVE state_type=
IF n(s)=0 THEN single_stepl(s)
ELSE
statel(single_stepl(s WITH [ (n) :=n(s)-1])) 
ENDIF
MEASURE n(s)
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% LEMMAS to help prove the TCC generated
st_tran_CC_MS: LEMMA 
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS(Input_Control(









n (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transition_MM_MS (state_transition_CC_MS 




n (state_transition_CC_NET (state_transition_MM_NET (state_transition_MM_M 
S (state_transition_CC_MS(
Input_Control(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-1],test))))))<n(s)
statel_TCCl: LEMMA 
FORALL(s:state_type):
NOT n(s) =0 IMPLIES n(single_stepl(s WITH [(n):= n(s)-l])) < n(s)
% LEMMAS to prove the state TCC
s t_t ran_CC_MS_spec: LEMMA 
FORALL (n:nat):
NOT n(s)= 0 IMPLIES n(state_transition_CC_MS_Spec(Input_Control(
s WITH [ (n):=n(s)-l].test)))< n(s)




Input_Control(s WITH [ (n) : =n(s)-1], test) ) ) > <n(s)
State_TCC3: LEMMA 
FORALL (s:state_type):





Coiranunication_imp (Initial_state (s)) = Final_statel (s)
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TCC Proofs:
(| gsmlayer3_7 | (| Initial_state_TCCl | "* (ASSERT) NIL NIL)
(|Final_state_TCCl| "" (ASSERT) NIL NIL)
(jstate_TCCl| ”  (ASSERT)




((" 1" (REWRITE " state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
( C l ’ (SMASH) NIL NIL) ("2" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("3" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("4" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("5" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("6" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("7" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("8" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) C9" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("10" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("11" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL)
("12" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) ("13" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL) )
NIL) )
NIL)
("2" (POSTPONE) NIL NIL))
NIL))
NIL)
(|s t_tran_CC_MS| "" (SKOLEM!)
(("" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")






("7" (REWRITE "s tate_trans i t ion_CC_MS")
("8" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
("9" (SMASH) NIL NIL))NIL)
("2" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS") (("2" (SMASH) NIL NIL)) NIL))
NIL))NIL)
ZaSMMAS to Provo tho TCCS that tho typchochor could not 
provo:
(|state_TCC_intl| "" (SKOLEM!)
((" ’ (USE " st_tran_CC_MS")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS•)
(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL)








(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL)





















(j state_TCC_int3| "" (SKOLEM!)
((* • (USE *state_TCC_int2")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
(("1" (SMASH) NIL NIL)






((- - (USE "state_TCC_int3")
((*" (REWRITE "single_stepl’)
(("1" (SMASH)











(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS") 
(Cl" (SMASH)
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS") 
(("1" (SMASH)
(Cl" (REWRITE "Input_Control" +)
(Cl*
(REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS" + )



















("2" (REWRITE "single_stepl") (("2" (SMASH) NIL NIL)) NIL))
NIL) )
NIL) )
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NIL)
(|s t_tran_CC_MS_spec| *" (SKOLEM!)
(<’" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("1" (REWRITE -state_transition_CC_MS_Spec“)
(Cl- (SMASH) NIL NIL) ("2- (SMASH) NIL NIL) ("3" (SMASH) NIL NIL)
("4" (SMASH) NIL NIL) ("5" (SMASH) NIL NIL) ("6" (SMASH) NIL NIL)
("7" (SMASH) NIL NIL) C8' (SMASH) NIL NIL) C9" (SMASH) NIL NIL))
NIL)







(Cl- (REWRITE " Input_Control")










(C ’ (USE "state_TCC_intl_Spec')
((”  (REWRITE "single_step")
(Cl- (SMASH)
((" 1" (USE " s t_tran_CC_MS_spec")
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET_Spec" + )
((-1- (SMASH)
((”1’ (REWRITE ■ Input_Control" +)
(("1" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS_Spec" +)
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((”  (REWRITE " single_stepl")







( (*" (REWRITE "Input_Control")
(("" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_MS")
(('" (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_MS")
(("" (REWRITE *state_transition_MM_NET") 
((*" (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET")
( (* ’ (AUTO-REWRITE "statel")
((”  (REWRITE "statel")
(("" (AUTO-REWRITE "single_stepl")
( ( " "
(REWRITE "single_stepl")
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE "Input_Control") 
( ( " "
(REWRITE "Input_Control")
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS")





"state_transition_MM_MS") ( ( . .
(REWRITE 
"state_transition_MM_MS") 
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE 
"state_transition_MM_NET")
( ( " "
(REWRITE 
"state_transition_MM_NET")
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE 
"state_transition_CC_NET")
( ( " "
(REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_NET")
( C "  
(REWRITE 
"statel")
( ( " "  
(REWRITE 
"Final_statel")




















































(("" (REWRITE " state_transi tion_CC_MS_Spec")







( ( " "





























































((”  (REWRITE "single_stepl")
((”  (REWRITE "Input_Control’)
(( ”  (REWRITE ’s tate_trans i ti on_CC_MS")
((”  (REWRITE ’state_transition_MM_MS")
((”  (REWRITE "state_transition_MM_NET*) 
((”  (REWRITE "state_transition_CC_NET*) 
((”  (AUTO-REWRITE "statel’)
((”  (REWRITE "statel")
(("" (AUTO-REWRITE "single_stepl") 




( ( " "
(REWRITE "Input_Control")
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE
"state_transition_CC_MS") 
( ( " "
(REWRITE
" state_transition_CC_MS")











( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE 
"state_transition_CC_NET")





( ( " "
(REWRITE
"Communication_spec")
( ( " "
(REWRITE "state")( r .
(REWRITE
"single_step")





















( ( " "
(REWRITE 
"state")
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE "single_step") 
( ( " "
(REWRITE
"single_step")
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE 
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
( ( " "
(REWRITE 
"state_transition_CC_MS_Spec")
( ( " "
(AUTO-REWRITE 
"state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
( ( " "
(REWRITE
" state_transition_CC_NET_Spec")
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